Marital Property Rights in Transition by Waggoner, Lawrence W.
University of Michigan Law School
University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository
Articles Faculty Scholarship
1992
Marital Property Rights in Transition
Lawrence W. Waggoner
University of Michigan Law School, waggoner@umich.edu
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/articles/1681
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/articles
Part of the Estates and Trusts Commons, Family Law Commons, Legislation Commons, and the
State and Local Government Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Articles by an authorized administrator of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more
information, please contact mlaw.repository@umich.edu.
Recommended Citation
Waggoner, Lawrence W. "Marital Property Rights in Transition." Prob. Law. 18 (1992): 1-66.
MARITAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN 
TRANSITION 
by LAW RENCE W. WAGGONER* 
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  ,.......... 2 
I. Allocation of Original Ownership . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 
A. Historical Origins of Community and Separate 
Property Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 
B. Community versus Separate Property in this 
Country . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 
C. The Uniform Marital Property Act . . . . . . . . . . . 8 
D. Allocation Rules are Default Rules . . . . . . . . . . . 8 
II. Spousal Rights in Intestacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 
A. The Shift from Mandatory Rules to Default 
Rules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 
B. Formulating Modern Intestacy Rules . . . . . . . . . 10 
C. Common Demographic Characteristics of 
Intestates and their Surviving Spouses . . . . . . . . . 11 
* Lewis M. Simes Professor of Law, University of Michigan; Director of
Research and Chief Reporter, Joint Editorial Board for the Uniform Probate 
Code; Reporter, Restatement (Third) of Property (Donative Transfers). Portions 
of this lecture have been drawn from L. Waggoner, R. Wellman, G. Alexander & 
M. Fellows, Family Property Law: Wills, Trusts, and Future Interests (1991); 
Waggoner, The Multiple-Marriage Society and Spousal Rights Under the Revised 
Uniform Probate Code, 76 Iowa L. Rev. 223 (1991); Waggoner, Spousal Rights in 
Our Multiple-Marriage Society: The Revised Uniform Probate Code, 26 Real 
Prop., Prob. & Tr. J. 683 (1992). The helpful comments of David Chambers on 
Part IV are gratefully acknowledged. 
2 
D. Current Non-UPC Intestacy Laws are 
Typically Based on the English Approach of 
Granting a Fractional Share ... .. . . . .. .. . .. .. .  15 
E. The Uniform Probate Code . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 
III. Spousal Rights Upon Divorce and Against 
Disinheritance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 
A. The Partnership Theory of Marriage . . . . . . . . . . 25 
B. Equitable Distribution Upon Divorce . . . . . . . . . 27 
C. Protection Against Disinheritance. . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 
1. Conventional Elective-Share Law . . . . . . . . . . 29 
2. Implementing the Partnership Theory . . . . . 34 
3. Need to Supplement the Partnership 
Elective Share with a Support Element . . . . 39 
4. Protection Against Will Substitutes . . . . . . . . 41 
a. Common-Law Theories . . . . . .. . .... . ... 41 
b. Augmented-Estate Legislation . . . . . . . . . 45 
IV. Who is a Spouse? . .. .. . . . ... . . . ... .. . . . . . . .... . . . .  47 
A. Enforceability of an Express Contract - The 
"Meretricious" Consideration Problem . . . . . . . . 55 
B. Rights of Domestic Partners Who are Not 
Protected by a Provable Contract . . . . . . . . . . . . .  57 
Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66 
INTRODUCTION 
The subject of "marital property rights" is very timely because 
those rights are in a state of transition. The term "marital prop­
erty rights" covers a vast multitude of rights or interests con­
ferred by law on persons who occupy the status of spouse. 
This lecture is divided into four discrete, yet related segments. 
The first segment addresses how the law allocates original owner­
ship between spouses in a marriage. The second segment turns to 
the intestate share of the surviving spouse. This is not a topic 
that high-powered estate planners get involved in very much be­
cause intestate estates are usually fairly small. But to the surviv-
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ing spouse, the intestate share can mark the difference between 
economic security and poverty. The third segment addresses the 
rights of spouses upon divorce and disinheritance at death. The 
fourth and final segment surveys some recent developments re­
garding the rights of persons who are not spouses at all, but 
"near-spouses." 
The Uniform Probate Code was revised in 1990, and central 
parts of those revisions affect spousal rights. The American Col­
lege of Trust and Estate Counsel (the "College") was heavily rep­
resented in the discussion and final outcome of those revisions, 
through its three representatives to the Joint Editorial Board for 
the Uniform Probate Code, Chuck Collier, Joe Foster, past presi­
dent of the College (who actually joined the Board after the revi­
sions were completed), and Ray Young, and its three emeritus 
members, past presidents all, Harrison Durand, Harley Spitler, 
and of course Joe Straus, former Trachtman lecturer, and the fa­
ther of the Code. As a matter of fact, all but one of the members 
of the Board are also prominent members of the College though 
they officially represent either the American Bar Association or 
the Uniform Law Conference. Included in this latter group are a 
former president of the College and Trachtman lecturer, Mal 
Moore; the current Secretary of the Board of Regents, Jack 
Bruce; and two former Trachtman lecturers, Ed Halbach and 
John Langbein. The Board's State Courts Liaison, Jim Wade, is a 
member of the Board of Regents, and the Board's Executive Di­
rector and Chief Reporter of the original UPC, Dick Wellman, is 
a well-known Academic Fellow. 
In this lecture, I shall be reporting on the UPC revisions re­
garding spousal rights. If nothing else, those revisions have al­
ready stirred a renewed interest in and debate about spousal 
rights, and are likely to continue to do so for years to come. 
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I. ALLOCATION OF ORIGINAL 
O WNERSHIP 
Family property is like any resource, and spousal rights are just 
one characteristic of the allocation of those resources, albeit prob­
ably the most important one. So, I start with the question of how 
ownership of family property is allocated and distributed. For 
the most part, the law defers the distributive decision to the mem­
ber of the family who is the so-called owner of the property. The 
law, in other words, appears merely to be a facilitator rather than 
a direct regulator in this field. When a dispute arises regarding 
the distribution of property, the law arbitrates the dispute by ref­
erence to the donor's intention. The lawyers among us have all 
read hundreds of court opinions containing the stock phrase "the 
donor's intention is the polestar of construction." 
But the law's deference to the donor's intention somewhat dis­
guises the truly important question of who is or can be the donor, 
or stated another way, who is the owner of the family property 
and hence the person with economic power within the family. 
Regarding original ownership (hence economic power) between 
spouses, it is the law, not the donor, that makes the crucial alloca­
tive decision. Although the law makes this allocative decision, 
the law throughout the world and, indeed, within the United 
States, is not uniform. In this country, two fundamentally diver­
gent legal systems for allocating original ownership between 
spouses co-exist. I refer, of course, to the profound difference be­
tween the community-property and separate-property systems. 
During an ongoing marriage, the basic principle in the sepa­
rate-property states (also called common-law or title-based states) 
is that marital status does not affect the ownership of property. 
The regime is one of separate property. Each spouse owns all 
that he or she earns. By contrast, in the community-property 
states, each spouse acquires an ownership interest in half the 
property the other earns during the marriage, regardless of how 
the property is nominally titled. By granting each spouse upon 
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acquisition an immediate half interest in the earnings of the other, 
the community-property regimes directly recognize that spouses 
are partners rather than sole proprietors. 
A. Historical Origins of Community and Separate 
Property Systems 
The divergence between separate and community marital prop­
erty ideas dates to the thirteenth century. The separate-property 
(title-based) system derives from English common law, while 
community property developed in continental Europe and was 
transplanted to the new world by French and Spanish settlers. 
The reasons for the divergence between the systems in England 
and the continental nations remain somewhat obscure. 1 One 
plausible explanation is that, while England had all of the other 
ingredients that led to community property in France, it lacked 
any strong tradition of community within the family, at least one 
that extended beyond the nuclear family. Professor Donahue has 
argued: "Without any strong tradition of community, the English 
lawyers could not group these same [French] elements together 
and call it community. They lacked at an early stage the social 
practice around which the legal concept could crystallize and at a 
slightly later stage the legal concept around which the social 
practice could crystallize. "2 
There seems to be no doubt that the English system was male­
dominated. Jeremy Bentham, the founder of Utilitarianism, 
wrote that "the stronger [referring to males] have had all the pref­
erences. Why? Because the stronger have made the laws."3 Un­
til the latter part of the nineteenth century, the husband became 
the owner of his wife's personalty upon marriage4 and had what 
I. See Wenig, The Marital Property Law of Connecticut: Past, Present and 
Future, !990 Wis. L. Rev. 807, 811-16. 
2. Donahue, What Causes Fundamental Legal Ideas? Marital Property in 
England and France in the Thirteenth Century, 78 Mich. L. Rev. 59, 86-87 
(1979). 
3. J. Bentham, The Theory of Legislation 177-78 (C.K. Ogden ed. 1931). 
4. See T. Atkinson, Handbook of the Law of Wills 42 (2d ed. 1953). 
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was called a "tenancy by the marital right" in his wife's land. 5 
This gave the husband the right to the rents and profits from the 
land his wife owned at the time of their marriage or acquired 
during their marriage (until the birth of issue). Upon birth of 
issue, the husband's tenancy turned into the estate in curtesy. 
This system persisted in England and the United States until the 
latter part of the nineteenth century. The estate was abolished by 
legislation that came to be called the Married Women's Property 
Acts. These acts actually differed in detail, but their basic effect 
was to return the wife's property to her control, free from her 
husband's claims or control. 6 
B. Community versus Separate Property in this Country 
In this country, eight states originally adopted the community­
property system and the other states and the District of Columbia 
adopted the separate-property (common-law) system. What we 
have, then, is communal ownership in nearly twenty percent of 
the states, individual ownership in over eighty percent. 
Reflect on how profoundly these systems differ. Community 
property reinforces a married spouse's sense of participation in 
the marriage and ownership of the marital estate. Separate prop­
erty tends to place the nonpropertied spouse in a subordinate po­
sition. How did this split on so fundamental a question come 
about? It came about partly by historical accident. Community 
property was mostly adopted in the territories first settled by 
Spanish settlers. It "continues today chiefly in the states carved 
out of the former Spanish possessions."7 This explains why the 
eight original community-property states are located in the west 
and south west. 8 The separate-property system, on the other 
5. Haskins, Estates Arising from the Marriage Relationship and Their Char­
acteristics, in I American Law of Property §§ 5 .50-.55 (A. Casner ed. 1 952). 
6. Jd. at § 5 .56. 
7. Moynihan, Community Property, in 2 American Law of Property § 7.2 
(A. Casner ed. 1952). 
8. The original community-property states were Arizona, California, Idaho, 
Louisiana, Nevada, New Mexico, Texas, and Washington. This is not to say that 
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hand, was adopted in the territories first settled by English set­
tlers, the eastern states, and it spread westward from there. 
Historical accident may also explain why the original commu­
nity-property states adopted the community of acquests concept 
of the Spanish legal system. Under that concept, each spouse 
owns a half interest in the earnings of the other acquired during 
the marriage, in effect as a tenant in common; property acquired 
prior to the marriage and property acquired during the marriage 
by gift, bequest, or inheritance are not counted in the community, 
and so remain separate property. The other community-property 
model, called universal community, has not appeared in this 
country. In universal-community systems, each spouse owns a 
half interest in all the property of the other, regardless of the 
property's source or time of acquisition. 9 
Interest in the community-of-acquests system over the years 
has not been limited to the original states, however. During the 
1930s and 40s, before Congress allowed the joint income-tax re­
turn for married persons, several separate-property states con­
verted to community property in order to grant their residents 
the tax benefits of community property's income-splitting effect. 
When the income-splitting joint return was adopted in 1948, 
these states converted back to the separate-property regime, 
all these states adopted community law without debate, nor that all were once 
Spanish possessions. Six of the original states adopted the English common law, 
but at the same time or after several years, replaced the English system of dower 
and curtesy with community property. See W. McClanahan, Community Prop­
erty Law in the United States ch. 3 ( 1 982); Wenig, supra note 1 ,  at 8 1 8-2 1 .  
9 .  Because both spouses own community property, problems arise concern­
ing management of community assets. Community-property states have statutes 
prescribing who has power to manage and deal with the assets. These statutes 
vary considerably in their details, but some generalizations are possible. In 
Texas, the wife has sole management power over her earnings that are kept sepa­
rate, and the husband has sole management power over his. In California and 
several other community-property states, either spouse has power, acting alone, 
to manage community assets. Both spouses, however, ordinarily are required to 
join in transfers or mortgages of community real property. If one spouse makes a 
gift of community property to a third party, the non-donor spouse may set it 
aside entirely or in excess of a stated amount. 
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which had the effect of conserving traditional gender roles and 
power relationships within the marriage. 10 
C. The Uniform Marital Property Act 
More recently, interest in community property has been rekin­
dled by a growing conviction in favor economic equalization be­
tween husbands and wives. The idea that each marital partner 
should share equally acquests from the economic activity of the 
other led to the promulgation in 1983 of the Uniform Marital 
Property Act (UMPA). UMPA, drafted by our former president, 
Bill Cantwell, adopts a version of the community of acquests, 
although the terminology used in UMPA is different - commu­
nity property is called "marital property," separate property is 
called "individual property."1 1  Under UMPA, as under commu­
nity property, each spouse acquires a present, vested ownership 
right in all the assets acquired by the economic activities of either 
during the marriage; the right does not depend on survival of the 
other spouse. Wisconsin adopted UMPA in 1986, 12  and is now 
properly counted as the ninth community-property state. 1 3  
D .  Allocation Rules are Default Rules 
Even these rules of original ownership are default rules. They 
yield to a contrary intention. But the two systems are far from 
parallel in how a contrary intention must be formed. For spouses 
in community-property states to decide to operate as sole proprie-
10. See Jones, Split-Income and Separate Spheres: Tax Law and Gender 
Roles in the 1940s, 6 Law & Hist. Rev. 259 ( 1988); Wenig, supra note 1, at 82 1 -
24. 
1 1 .  With respect to income earned on individual property, UMPA follows 
the minority view and provides in § 4(d) that "income earned or accrued by a 
spouse or attributable to property of a spouse during marriage . . .  is marital 
property." 
1 2. Wis. Stat. Ann. §§ 766.001-766.979. 
1 3 . See Rev. Rul. 87- 1 3, 1987-1 C.B. 20. For tax purposes, the implication 
of this ruling is that the basis in both halves of marital property is stepped up to 
the value at the date of the decedent's death under IRC § 1014(b)(6). If marital 
property had been treated for tax purposes as tenancy-in-common property, only 
the decedent's half would have received a stepped-up basis. 
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tors, not financial partners, there must be mutual consent, in a 
premarital or postmarital agreement. For spouses in separate­
property states to operate as partners, the propertied spouse must 
decide to give ownership rights to the other spouse, by outright 
gift, or by putting his or her earnings into joint checking or 
money market accounts, joint tenancies or tenancies by the en­
tirety (which to varying degrees create property rights in the non­
contributing spouse). 
These rules, then, serve to reinforce the profoundly different 
symbolical and psychological feelings within the ongoing mar­
riage. Spouses are partners by right in community-property 
states. Spouses are partners, if at all, by the generosity or contin­
ued commitment to the marriage of the propertied spouse in sepa­
rate-property states. 
I shall return to the partnership theory of marriage in Part III 
of the lecture, when I focus on spousal rights upon dissolution of 
a marriage by divorce or disinheritance at death. Before that, 
however, I'd like to turn to a discussion of spousal rights in 
intestacy. 
II. SPOUSAL RIGHTS IN
INTESTACY 
Intestacy laws build upon the rules that allocate original own­
ership. Intestacy laws govern the distribution of property that 
the decedent "owns" at death. In the separate-property states, 
that means the property titled in the decedent's name. In the 
community-property states, that means the decedent's half of the 
community property and the decedent's separate property. Like 
the original-ownership rules, intestacy laws serve as default rules. 
The state's intestacy pattern of distribution prevails unless the de­
cedent has made a valid will. 
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A. The Shift from Mandatory Rules to Default Rules 
Intestacy laws have not always served as default rules. To be 
sure, the power to dispose of personal property by will was recog­
nized early. The ecclesiastical courts asserted jurisdiction over 
succession to personal property on death, and encouraged be­
quests for religious and charitable purposes, as well as for the 
decedent's family. During the Anglo-Saxon period, testamentary 
disposition of land was possible, but recognition ceased within 
about a century after the Norman Conquest. The devise of land 
by will "stood condemned," Maitland wrote, "because it is a 
death-bed gift, wrung from a man in his agony. In the interest of 
honesty, in the interest of the law state, a boundary must be main­
tained against ecclesiastical greed and the other-worldliness of 
dying men."14 The church courts never gained jurisdiction over 
succession to land and the Crown courts were not concerned with 
seeing that a man atoned for his wrongs by devoting a portion of 
his property to pious objects. 
This all came to a head in the Sixteenth Century. By the Eng­
lish Statute of Wills of 1540, 15 men (but not women) were 
granted the power to dispose of their land by will, in effect trans­
forming intestacy from rules of mandatory law into default rules. 
It was not until the Nineteenth Century that power of testation 
was granted to women by the Married Women's Property Acts. 16 
B. Formulating Modern Intestacy Rules 
How are or should modern intestacy rules be formulated, espe­
cially regarding the intestate share of the surviving spouse? In 
14. 2 F. Pollock & F. Maitland, History of English Law 328 (2d ed. 1 9 1 1 ). 
1 5. 34 & 35 Hen. 8, c. 5, § 14. 
16. For further discussion of the development of women's property rights in 
the United States, seeN. Basch, In the Eyes of the Law: Women, Marriage, and 
Property in Nineteenth-Century New York ( 1 982); M. Salmon, Women and the 
Law of Property in Early America ( 1 986); E. Warbase, The Changing Legal 
Rights of Married Women 1 800- 1 861  (1 987); Chused, Married Women's Prop­
erty Law, 1 800- 1 850 ( 1 983). See also S. Staves, Married Women's Separate 
Property in England, 1660- 1 833 ( 1990). 
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the last several years, the Joint Editorial Board for the Uniform 
Probate Code has had occasion to consider and debate that ques­
tion. The result of that deliberation, in which representatives of 
the College played a significant role, appears in the revisions of 
the Uniform Probate Code, promulgated by the Uniform Law 
Commissioners in 1990. 
That or any other consideration of spousal rights in intestacy 
must begin with the assumption that intestacy laws should reflect 
"common" intention. This is another way of underscoring the 
point that intestacy serves in default. No intestacy regime can 
hope to be "suitable" for every person who dies intestate. People 
whose individuated intention differs from common intention must 
assume the responsibility of making a will; otherwise, their prop­
erty will be distributed, by default, according to common inten­
tion or, more accurately, according to intention as attributed to 
them by the state legislature. 
C. Common Demographic Characteristics of Intestates 
and their Surviving Spouses 
In considering what intention legislatures should attribute to 
decedents regarding their surviving spouses, we should first know 
something about the demographics of those who predominantly 
die intestate. As one might expect, decedents dying intestate tend 
to be older and their estates tend to be rather modest. Although 
younger people overwhelmingly do not have wills, 17 and so the 
great majority of those dying young die intestate, they die in even 
lower numbers than you might guess. Only about 0.5% of the 
population (married and unmarried) die between ages 20 and 25, 
another 0.6% die between ages 25 and 30, and another 0.5% die 
between ages 30 and 35. That adds up to 1.6% dying between 20 
1 7. In telephone surveys conducted in five states in 1 977, the following per­
centages of persons in each age category said they did not have a will: 87.7% age 
1 7  to 30, 65.4% age 3 1  to 45, 39.3% age 46-54, 36.6% age 55 to 64, and 1 5.4% 
age 65 and over. See Fellows, Simon & Rau, Public Attitudes About Property 
Distribution at Death and Intestate succession Laws in the United States, 1 978 
Am. B. Found. Res. J. 3 19, 336-39. 
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and 35. Indeed, only another 0. 7% die between ages 35 and 40, 18 
so that only 3.3% die in the two decades between ages 20 and 40. 
It is between ages 60 and 90 that we get serious about dying, for 
that is the period in which nearly three-fourths of the population 
die.19 Although most people age 65 and older have wills, the mi­
nority who die without wills make up a much larger number of 
people than the cohort of young people who die prematurely. 
In terms of wealth, 72.3% of persons with estates valued be­
tween $0 and $99,999 do not have wills, 49.8% with estates be­
tween $100,000 and $199,999 do not have wills, but only 15.4% 
with estates between $200,000 and $1 million do not have wills. 20 
We can expect, therefore, that decedents dying intestate will 
typically be older than 60 and have an estate valued below 
$200,000. What about the demographic characteristics of their 
surviving spouses? We know that they will likely be wives, not 
husbands, for wives tend to outlive their husbands. This is not 
only because women live longer than men,21 but also because 
wives tend to be, on average, nearly three years younger than 
their husbands. 22 It should not be surprising, therefore, that mar­
ried women of middle age, on average, will become widowed 
before turning 70 and will live fifteen more years. 23 
What are the needs of these surviving spouses? They are, by 
and large, beyond working years. This forces them to rely to a 
great extent on capital-generated income and makes them vulner-
18 .  See Table 80CNSMT, in Fed. Est. & Gift Tax Rep. (CCH) � 64 1 5.301 
(1 989). 
19. See id. 
20. See Fellows, Simon & Rau, supra note 17 .  The estate figures have been 
adjusted for inflation. Between 1977, when the surveys were conducted, and 
1992, when this lecture was prepared, the consumer price index has about 
doubled. To reflect this increase in inflation, I have doubled the figures reported 
in the original article. 
2 1 .  Average life expectancy is projected to be 78 years for women, 72 years 
for men. See U.S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States: 
1991 ,  tbl. 105, at 73 ( l l l th ed. 1991). 
22. See id. tbl. 1 32, at 88. 
23. Nordheimer, A New Abuse of Elderly: Theft by Kin and Friends, New 
York Times, Dec. 16, 199 1 ,  p. A I  at p. A 1 2  col. 3. 
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able to the ebbs and flows of interest rates. 24 Apart from their 
social security payments and perhaps a small pension, the princi­
pal source of income for nonworking surviving spouses is the in­
come they earn on their investments. 25 For elderly surviving 
spouses of less wealthy decedents, those who are most likely to 
die intestate, that means the interest they earn on their certificates 
of deposit.26 As of 1991, average social security payments barely 
exceeded the poverty level. The excess was only $34 a month for 
nondisabled widows and widowers and only $76 a month for re­
tired workers.27 Contrary to the image of the elderly as "fat cats 
24. See Barringer, As Interest Rates A re Cut, Retirees A re Stung, N.Y. Times 
at 9 (July 5, 1992) (Retirees "see themselves as the economy's other losers . . . .  
They invested in savings accounts and certificates of deposits, only to watch their 
income be drastically reduced as the Federal Reserve sliced its discount rate from 
6.5 percent in January of 199 1  to 3 percent last week."); Lewis, More Folks Feel 
Pinch, 33 American Association of Retired Persons Bulletin 1 ,  12  (March 1992) 
("[R)esearchers at Economic Analysis Associates in Stowe, Vt., estimate that for 
every percentage point drop in interest rates, investors 65 years and older lose 
$ 1 5  billion of income. The loss for persons between 55 and 64 is calculated at $4 
billion."); Liscio, Exploding Some Popular Myths, U.S. News & World Report 60 
(March 16, 1992) ("Economist Susan Stearne calculates that each I percentage 
point drop in [short-term interest] rates costs the over-5 5  set about $ 1 9  billion in 
interest income . . . .  "). 
25. As of 1990, according to the U.S. Census Bureau, the principal sources of 
income for persons over 65 were social security (37.8%), earnings ( 15 .5%), pen­
sions ( 16.9%), and investments (24.7%). See Lewis, Ups and Downs of the 
1980's: New Income Data Refutes [sic] "Fat Cat" Age Stereotype, American Asso­
ciation of Retired Persons Bulletin I, 1 5  (Feb. 1992). Another study, conducted 
in Florida, found that, in 1990, social security was the main source of income for 
44% of those 60 and over. See Wilson, Interest-Rate Plunge Chills Savers, Ann 
Arbor News, Feb. 9, 1 992, at C5, col. I (Associated Press). 
26. The Public Policy Institute of the American Association of Retired Per­
sons reports that people 65 and over derive 1 7.5% of their income from interest­
bearing accounts, compared to just 5 .5% for those 45 through 64 and 3% for 
those under 45. See Lewis, supra note 24. 
27. Average social security payments were $6,672 per year or $556 per 
month for nondisabled widows and widowers and $7,236 per year or $603 per 
month ($679/month for men, $5 1 8/month for women) for retired workers. See 
U.S.Dep't of Health & Human Services, Social Security Administration, Social 
Security Bulletin, Annual Statistical Supplement at 2, 1 78, 196 ( 199 1  ). 
As of 1990, the poverty level for single persons age 65 and over was $6,268 per 
year or $522 per month. See U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Poverty in the United 
States: 1990 at 195 ( 1991). The government's "poverty index" is a very crude 
measure, however. It is based largely on outdated assumptions concerning con­
sumption behavior. By one study, "if the consumption standards used to calcu-
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living the good life at the expense of everybody else,"28 govern­
ment reports indicate that "twenty percent of all elderly widows 
were poor."29 About 40% of the elderly, in fact, are either poor 
or near-poor, "near-poor" being defined as having an income no 
more than two times the poverty level. 30 A Florida study re­
cently found that 31% of those 60 and over reported incomes of 
less than $10,000 annually. 3 1  
Given these demographic characteristics of intestates and their 
surviving spouses, I think we must next make certain basic as­
sumptions about the marriage itself and the decedent's motives. 
Sound public policy, I believe, requires that we assume that the 
marriage is solid (that the partners remain committed to one an­
other) and that the decedent has what may be described as "just" 
motives. After all, the marriages we are talking about have ended 
in death, not divorce, and there has been no effort by the decedent 
to disinherit his or her surviving spouse. To assume that those 
marriages are other than solid would be to make a distinctly un­
fortunate cultural statement about the institution of marriage in 
American society. Included within the assumption that dece­
dents have "just" motives are that decedents mean to be generous 
to their surviving spouses, mean to strike a fair balance between 
their surviving spouses and children (that is, to be fair to all), but, 
above all, in striking that fair balance, mean at the very least to 
provide economic security for their surviving spouses. 32 The link, 
of course, between need and intention is that need shapes inten-
late the index were updated, it would raise aged poverty by at least 50 percent." 
Schulz, "Poverty Level" - Worn-Out Words to Hide the Truth, 33 American 
Association of Retired Persons Bulletin 18 (March 1992). 
28. Lewis, supra note 25. 
29. See U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Population Profile of the United States, 
1989, at 41 ( 1 989). 
30. Lewis, supra note 25. 
31. See Wilson, supra note 25. 
32. Obviously, not all marriages are ideal and not all decedents have "just" 
motives. But these assumptions are not unfair to people whose marriages or mo­
tives fall outside the mold. Decedents whose marriages are less than ideal must 
be expected to understand that their situation calls for individuated action. They 
must make their own wills (or get divorced). 
15 
tion - surviving spouses's need for economic security shapes de­
cedents's intentions or, more accurately, shapes the intentions 
that the state should properly attribute to decedents. 
D. Current Non-UPC Intestacy Laws are Typically 
Based on the English Approach of Granting a 
Fractional Share 
How responsive are our current intestacy laws to these 
demographics and assumptions? They do not respond well in 
those states that still retain the pattern of intestacy transplanted 
from England. This is because the English antecedent deter­
mined the surviving spouse's share by fraction. Only in the larger 
intestate estates can a fractional share provide the surviving 
spouse with enough capital to generate an adequate stream of in­
come. In the smaller intestate estates, such as in a $30,000 intes­
tate estate, a fractional share of one-half gives the surviving 
spouse only $15,000. The full $30,000 would be insufficient, but 
the intestacy laws cannot manufacture larger estates for people. 
The most they can do is give the full $30,000 to the surviving 
spouse. 
The English Statute of Distribution of 1670, which governed 
the intestate distribution of personal property, did not even give a 
one-half share. The share provided the decedent's widow in that 
statute was one-third; the remaining two-thirds was divided 
among the decedent's children or their issue by representation. 
Only if there were no children or issue was the widow's share 
increased to one-half; the other half went to the decedent's ances­
tors and collateral relatives. Under no circumstances did the 
widow have a right to her husband's entire estate. The statute did 
not bother to provide for a surviving husband's share because, as 
noted earlier, the wife's personalty became her husband's upon 
marriage. 
The descent of land followed a similar pattern of fractional 
shares for widows. Although surviving spouses received no share 
at all under the canons of descent, they were provided for by the 
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estates of dower and curtesy. Dower gave each widow a life es­
tate in one-third of her deceased husband's land. Curtesy gave 
each widower a life estate in all of his deceased wife's land. 
For the most part, the non-UPC intestacy laws of this country 
follow a similar pattern. If the decedent is survived by children 
(or descendants of deceased children), the spouse's share will 
likely be one-third, with the remaining two-thirds going to the 
decedent's descendants. 33 This is so even when some or all of 
them are minors, in which case any portion the minors inherit 
must be placed in a normally cumbersome and expensive guardi­
anship form of ownership. More importantly, it is also so even 
when some or all of them are able-bodied adults with adequate 
means of support, in which case the surviving spouse is the more 
typical surviving spouse who is elderly and dependent on capital 
for income. If the decedent is not survived by children (or de­
scendants of deceased children), but is survived by one or both 
parents, the spouse's share will likely be one-half, with the other 
half going to the decedent's parent or parents, even though the 
parents may be financially self-sufficient ("WOOPS," in new­
speak, standing for well-off older people).34 Only if the decedent 
leaves no surviving descendants or parents does the surviving 
spouse commonly inherit the entire intestate estate. 
33. Other variations exist. Some non-UPC statutes provide for a 50/50 split 
between the surviving spouse and the descendants. Others provide the spouse a 
one-half share if there is one descendant but a one-third share if there is more 
than one descendant, the remaining half or two-thirds going to the descendants. 
Still others provide a variety of unique patterns of division between the spouse 
and descendants. Normally, no distinction is drawn between decedent's descend­
ants who are also descendants of the spouse and those descendants who are not 
also the spouse's descendants. For a compilation of the various statutory pat­
terns as of 1 978, see Fellows, Simon & Rau, supra note 1 7, at 357 n. l 28. 
34. Other variations exist. In a few states, the spouse must share the estate 
with the decedent's siblings if both parents have predeceased. Others have unique 
systems for allocating the estate between the spouse and parents. Some non-UPC 
law gives the entire estate to the surviving spouse and nothing to the decedent's 
parents. See id. at 348-50. 
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E. The Uniform Probate Code 
As originally promulgated in 1969, the Uniform Probate Code 
(pre-1990 UPC) continued the common practice of granting the 
decedent's surviving spouse the entire intestate estate when the 
decedent left neither surviving issue nor surviving parents. But 
the pre-1990 UPC made a significant and ingenious departure 
from the factional-share approach commonly applied to cases in 
which there were surviving issue or a surviving parent. Here, the 
pre-1990 UPC used a lump-sum-plus-a-fraction approach.35 The 
genius of the lump-sum-plus-a-fraction approach is that it gives 
the surviving spouse first claim to a certain amount of capital. If 
the lump sum specified is adequate and if the estate is large 
enough to discharge that responsibility and have assets to spare, 
then dividing the remaining part of the estate between the spouse 
and the issue or parents does not jeopardize the spouse's eco­
nomic security. In the pre-1990 Code, when the cost of living 
was less than a third of what it is today, the lump sum granted off 
the top was $50,000.36 Only to the extent the estate exceeded that 
minimum figure of $50,000 (over $150,000 in today's dollars) 
would the balance be split between the spouse and children or 
parents. In a $100,000 estate, for example, the spouse's share was 
$75,000, with $25,000 going to the decedent's descendants or par­
ents. In a $150,000 estate, the spouse took $100,000, with 
$50,000 going to the descendants or parents. 
Studies before and after 1969 suggest that the pre-1990 Code 
may not have gone far enough. These empirical studies have 
identified a strong social preference to give the entire estate to the 
surviving spouse, even when the decedent has surviving children 
or parents. Some of these studies were based on an examination 
of the probated wills of similarly situated decedents who died 
35. The lump-sum-plus-a-fraction approach was derived from § 22 of the 
Model Probate Code. 
36. Some states adopting a lump-sum-plus-a-fraction approach have used a 
different figure, ranging from a low of $20,000 in Florida and Missouri to a high 
of $ 100,000 in Alabama. 
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during a particular time frame in a particular localityY Other 
studies were based on interviews with living persons. 38 
The message of these studies seems clear: The typical decedent 
with children sees the surviving spouse in a dual role - first and 
foremost as the decedent's primary beneficiary, but also as a con­
duit through which to benefit their children. If the decedent dies 
prematurely, at a time when the couple's children are still minors, 
the surviving spouse is seen as occupying a better position to use 
the decedent's property for the benefit of their children, as well as 
for himself or herself. For a decedent who lives well beyond the 
minority of their children, as most do, the surviving spouse will 
likely be older and have greater economic needs than their chil­
dren. By then the children are probably middle-aged, working 
adults whose support comes from labor-generated income, as op­
posed to the surviving spouse, who is likely to be dependent on 
37. See. e. g. ,  M. Sussman, J. Cates & D. Smith, The Family and Inheritance 
86-87, 89-90, 143- 45 ( 1970) (for those testators survived by spouse and lineal kin, 
85.8 percent of the decedent testators (N = 226) and 85.3 percent of the testators 
(N = 367) in the survivor population provided that the spouse receive the entire 
estate; in 33 of 37 cases where the testator was not survived by lineal descendants 
or ascendants but was survived by a spouse, the spouse received the entire estate); 
Browder, Recent Patterns of Testate Succession in the United States and England, 
67 Mich. L. Rev. 1 303, 1307-09 ( 1969) (26 of the 54 testators left their entire 
estates to their spouse and not to their issue; of those 1 8  testators who distributed 
the estate to both spouse and issue, six designed their wills to give the spouse only 
that amount equal to the maximum marital deduction available for federal estate 
tax purposes at that time; in 9 of the 13 instances in which the testator was 
survived by a spouse and no children, the testator gave the spouse the entire 
estate); Dunham, The Method. Process and Frequency of Wealth Transmissions at 
Death, 30 U. Chi. L. Rev. 24 1 ,  252-53 ( 1 963) (in the 22 testate estates where the 
deceased was survived by spouse and children, 100 percent left all of the property 
to the spouse; in all but one of the six cases in which the testator was survived by 
a spouse but no children, the testator gave the spouse all of the property). 
38. See Fellows, Simon & Rau, supra note 1 7, at 35 1 -54, 358-64, 366-68 
(found the majority favored granting entire estate to the spouse regardless of the 
level of wealth involved); Contemporary Studies Project, A Comparison of 
Iowans' Dispositive Preferences with Selected Provisions of the Iowa and [Pre-1990] 
Uniform Probate Codes, 63 Iowa L. Rev. 1041 ,  1089 ( 1978) (found the percent­
age who favored granting the entire estate to the spouse decreased as the level of 
wealth increased); U.K. Law Comm'n, Report on Family Law: Distribution on 
Intestacy, 1989, No. 1 87, app. C, at 36-37, 40- 45 (well over 70% of the respon­
dents favored the spouse receiving the entire estate regardless of whether the 
decedent was also survived by minor children, adult children, or siblings). 
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capital-generated income to lift him or her above the poverty 
level. That does not mean, however, that the conduit theory does 
not operate for adult children. The adult children stand to inherit 
any unconsumed portion of the decedent's property at the surviv­
ing spouse's death. 
These studies, along with other evidence, 39 led the Joint Edito­
rial Board to make substantial changes in the spouse's share in 
the 1990 Code. The 1990 Code continues the pattern of giving 
the surviving spouse the entire estate when the decedent is not 
survived by descendants or parents. It goes further, however, and 
provides that the surviving spouse also receives the entire estate 
when the decedent is survived by descendants, as long as those 
descendants are also the descendants of the surviving spouse and 
the surviving spouse has no descendants who are not the 
decedent's. 
Marriages with step-children - sometimes called "blended 
families" - are another matter. With divorce and remarriage a 
common circumstance in society today, many married couples 
will end up having children by prior marriages on one or both 
sides.40 By introducing divided loyalties, the existence of step­
children weakens the conduit theory. A statute that gives the en­
tire estate to the surviving spouse of a decedent who leaves chil-
39. The move to have the spouse inherit the entire estate is aligned with 
trends in intestacy laws throughout the U.S. and Europe. A recent report of the 
U.K. Law Commission recommended granting the surviving spouse the entire 
intestate estate in all circumstances. See U.K. Law Comm'n, supra note 38, at 8-
12. In her recent book, Mary Ann Glendon has identified this trend, which she 
calls the "shrinking circle of heirs" phenomenon. See M. Glendon, The Trans­
formation of Family Law 238 (1989). By this she means that, over time, 
throughout the U.S. and Europe, "the position of the surviving spouse has stead­
ily improved everywhere at the expense of the decedent's blood relatives." /d. 
She goes on to point out that this trend "strikingly illustrate[s] the movement of 
modem marriage into the foreground of family relationships." /d. at 239. It 
recognizes "the gradual attenuation of legal bonds among family members 
outside the conjugal unit of husband, wife, and children," and "[t]he tendency to 
view a marriage that lasts until death as a union of the economic interests of the 
spouses . . . .  " /d. at 238, 240. 
40. "One out of every three Americans is now a stepparent, a stepchild, a 
stepsibling, or some other member of a stepfamily." Larson, Understanding 
Stepfamilies, Am. Demographics, July 1992, at 36. 
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dren by a prior marriage puts those children at the risk of 
permanent "loss" of inheritance. Similarly, a statute that gives 
the entire estate to the surviving spouse who has children by a 
prior marriage puts the decedent's children at risk of partial loss 
of inheritance.41 Thus, the dilemma in the stepparent situations 
becomes one of striking a reasonable balance between the needs of 
the surviving spouse and the inheritance expectations of the dece­
dent's children. 
The pre-1990 Code sought to address the question of step-rela­
tionships. Under the pre-1990 Code, the surviving spouse of a 
decedent who had children by a prior marriage did not receive a 
lump-sum-plus-a-fraction. The pre-1990 Code reverted to the 
straight fractional-share approach in that situation. The pre-1990 
Code provided for a 50/50 split of the decedent's property be­
tween the decedent's spouse and descendants. The problem with 
this approach is that it sacrifices the surviving spouse's economic 
security in the smaller to modest estates in order to preserve in­
heritance expectations of adult children who, unlike the surviving 
spouse, are in the labor market and not forced to rely for subsis­
tence on capital-generated income. Remember also that the fact 
that the decedent has children by a prior marriage does not neces­
sarily mean that the decedent did not have any joint children with 
the second and surviving spouse. Nor does it necessarily mean 
that the decedent's second marriage was a short-term, late-in-life 
marriage.42 The decedent's second marriage could, in fact, be his 
or her main marriage in life. 
41 .  The possibility that the same moral conflict will arise after the decedent's 
death, should the surviving spouse remarry and have children by his or her new 
spouse, exists but must be disregarded. As currently constituted, intestacy law 
requires the decision as to how much to award the surviving spouse to be made 
on the basis of the facts existing at the decedent's death. 
42. Even if it was, the decedent's surviving spouse may deserve this amount 
as rough compensation for having taken care of the decedent in his or her dying 
years. For every person receiving long-term care in a nursing home, another 2 
people living in the community have long-term care needs. Seventy to 80% of 
these people are cared for by their families at home. See Teachers Insurance and 
Annuity Ass'n, Long-Term Care 2, I I  ( 1 992). 
2 1  
The 1990 revtswns address the step-children dilemma differ­
ently. The 1990 revisions invoke the lump-sum-plus-a-fraction 
device for these situations also. The intent is to grant a share that 
is commensurate with the size of the estate and the circumstances 
of the family make-up. In the typical intestate estate of small to 
modest size, this approach would give the surviving spouse the 
entire estate. 43 In allocating scarce resources such as these, 
granting economic security to the surviving spouse appears more 
important than playing to the inheritance expectations of the de­
cedent's adult children. 
In the larger intestate estates, the UPC approach is predicated 
on the notion that the decedent would feel that some provision 
for his or her children would not deprive the surviving spouse of 
economic security.44 For larger estates, the lump-sum-plus-a­
fraction device assures that the decedent's children receive an 
inheritance. 
The 1990 Code draws a distinction between cases in which only 
the surviving spouse has children by a prior marriage and cases in 
which the decedent has children by a prior marriage. In the for-
43. A factor that makes this even more likely is that, under the UPC scheme, 
the intestate share is in addition to the probate exemptions and allowances, 
which run mostly in favor of the surviving spouse. Specifically, § 2- 402 gives the 
surviving spouse a homestead allowance of $ 15,000; § 2- 403 gives the surviving 
spouse an exempt property allowance up to $10,000 in household furniture, 
automobiles, furnishings, appliances, and personal effects (non-liquid assets and 
therefore not available to generate income); and §§ 2- 404 and -405 authorize the 
personal representative to determine a family allowance up to $ 1 ,500/month for 
one year ($ 1 8,000) without court authority. The family allowance does not nec­
essarily go exclusively to the surviving spouse, however. If the decedent left mi­
nor or dependent children who are not living with the surviving spouse, the 
allowance may go partly to or for the benefit of those children and partly to the 
surviving spouse. If the decedent left children by a prior marriage who are 
adults, and if the surviving spouse has ample resources (including life-insurance 
proceeds etc. from the decedent by way of will substitute), the personal represent­
ative can take those resources into account and determine a family allowance of a 
lesser amount and if the personal representative does not determine a lesser 
amount, the children can challenge the personal representative's decision. 
44. Economic security for the surviving spouse would be further safeguarded 
in estates in which the decedent created will substitutes providing for the spouse, 
such as joint tenancies, joint checking, savings, or money-market accounts, life­
insurance contracts, and pension plan arrangements. 
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mer case, the surviving spouse is granted the first $150,000 plus 
50% of any remaining balance. In the latter case, the surviving 
spouse is granted the first $100,000 plus 50% of any remaining 
balance. 
Lest granting the surviving spouse a minimum claim on the 
first $100,000 appears over-generous, and hence unfair to the de­
cedent's children by the prior marriage, consider that at today's 
"CD" interest rates of around 4%,45 $100,000 generates only 
$333 a month ($4,000 a year) in income. With average social se­
curity payments added in, the surviving spouse's income only 
rises to $889 a month ($10,668 a year), which is a mere $367 a 
month ($4400 a year) above the poverty level. This still puts the 
surviving spouse into the category of the near-poor (defined as 
persons with incomes less than twice the poverty level). Even if 
short-term interest rates return to the 8% level of a year and a 
half ago, the income yield rises only $333 a month ($4,000 a 
year). A surviving spouse who only has social security and 
$100,000 in assets will still be in jeopardy of outliving those as­
sets, especially if he or she lives into deep old age, as so many now 
do. To the extent that the interest plus social security prove in­
sufficient, capital will need to be drawn down, perhaps to the 
point of exhaustion or near exhaustion, or standard of living will 
need to be further lowered.46 With high real estate taxes and high 
costs of prescription drugs and other medical procedures not cov­
ered by Medicare, not to mention nursing home expenses should 
that become necessary,47 the cost of living for the elderly often 
rises faster than the general inflation rate. 
45. Current interest rates on 6-month CD's average 3.68%; on ! -year CD's, 
4.03%; and on 21/2-year CD's, 4.9 1 %. See N.Y. Times, July 5, 1992, § 3, at 1 6. 
46. We are currently experiencing a general inflation rate of about 3 . 1  %. See 
N.Y. Times, July 15,  1992, C l  at C13. If $ 100,000 is invested in "CDs" yielding 
4% interest, and if $10,000 is withdrawn each year (adjusted upward for a 3% 
inflation rate), $ 100,000 will only last 10 years. Reducing annual withdrawals to, 
say, $7,000 extends the period to 1 5  years. See tables published in J. Quinn, 
Making the Most of Your Money 893-94 ( 1 991). 
47. Two out of 5 people over 65 will spend some time in a nursing home 
during their lifetimes. Nearly 75% of all nursing home residents are women. 
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These computations assume that the surviving spouse receives 
as much as $100,000 in cash that can be invested in "CDs." In 
fact, some of the decedent's estate will probably be distributed in 
kind, that is, in the form of specific assets that are illiquid, thus 
decreasing the income-generating potential of the spouse's share. 
Of course, some surviving spouses need not depend on a share 
of the decedent's intestate estate for economic security. Some al­
ready have independent means or will benefit from will substi­
tutes such as life insurance, pension death benefits or annuities, 
joint tenancies, or joint banking or money market accounts. Be­
cause intestacy laws, by tradition, are kept simple, however, they 
do not reduce the spouse's share by the amount of the spouse's 
assets. Unless this constraint on the intestacy laws is to be bro­
ken, it necessitates designing those laws on the assumption that 
the surviving spouse does not have independent means and will 
not benefit appreciably from will substitutes. This approach is 
the only way to guarantee all surviving spouses a minimum de­
gree of economic security. It does require, not unfairly, it seems 
to me, the decedent whose spouse has economic security to make 
a will in favor of his or her children by the prior marriage, if that 
is what the decedent thinks is appropriate. 
Costs range from $20,000 to $80,000 per year; 36% of these costs are currently 
borne by Medicaid. See Teachers Insurance and Annuity Ass'n, Long-Term 
Care 2, 1 1  ( 1 992). Note that the more the intestacy laws reduce the surviving 
spouse's share in order to favor adult children by a prior marriage, the more 
likely it becomes that state funds will have to be expended under Medicaid for 
nursing home care of the surviving spouse. This point alone should make state 
legislators more sympathetic to the UPC's l ump-sum-plus-a-fraction approach 
than to the inheritance expectations of the decedent's adult children by a prior 
marriage. 
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III. SPOUSAL RIGHTS UPON 
DIVORCE AND AGAINST 
DISINHERITANCE 
Suppose the decedent does make a will that gives little or noth­
ing to the surviving spouse. In the United States,48 the dece­
dent's spouse is the only relative who is protected against 
intentional disinheritance.49 Like the question of allocation of 
original ownership, disinheritance of a surviving spouse brings 
into question the fundamental nature of the economic rights of 
each spouse in a marital relationship, of how the institution of 
marriage is viewed in society. As noted earlier, the contemporary 
view of marriage is that it is a partnership, and that the financial 
component of marriage is that it is an economic partnership. 50 
48. In contrast, in the western European nations, a decedent cannot totally 
disinherit his or her children and sometimes cannot totally disinherit other blood 
relatives. In England and the principal commonwealth jurisdictions (the A ustra­
lian states, most of the Canadian provinces, and New Zealand), the statutory 
scheme known as Testator's Family Maintenance (TFM) is in place, by which 
the chancery judge is empowered to revise the dispositive provisions of a testa­
tor's will (including intestate shares, in an intestate estate) for the benefit of the 
decedent's relatives and other dependents. 
49. The decedent's children and possibly more remote descendants are 
granted protection only against unintentional disinheritance. 
50. One of the earliest American expressions of the partnership theory of 
marriage appears in the 1963 Report of the Committee on Civil and Political 
Rights to the President's Commission on the Status of Women. As quoted in the 
Prefatory Note to the Uniform Marital Property Act, the Report states: 
Marriage is a partnership to which each spouse makes a different but equally 
important contribution. This fact has become increasingly recognized in the 
realities of American family living. While the laws of other countries have 
reflected this trend, family laws in the United States have lagged behind. 
The strength of the attribution to marriage of an economic partnership is evi­
denced by the recent New Jersey case of Carr v. Carr, 576 A.2d 872 (N.J. 1990). 
In that case, a husband, after having left his wife of seventeen years, died during 
the pendency of a divorce proceeding initiated by the wife. The husband's will 
devised his entire estate to his children by a former marriage. The court held that 
the husband's death terminated the divorce proceeding under which the wife 
would have been entitled to a share determined under New Jersey's equitable­
distribution statute. The wife also had no recourse under New Jersey's elective­
share statute because that statute withheld an elective share from a surviving 
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A. The Partnership Theory of Marriage5 1 
The partnership theory of marriage, sometimes called the mari­
tal-sharing theory, is variously stated and supported. Sometimes 
it is portrayed "as an expression of the presumed intent of hus­
bands and wives to pool their fortunes on an equal basis, share 
and share alike."52 Under this approach, the economic rights of 
each spouse are seen as deriving from an unspoken or imputed 
spouse if the decedent and spouse were not living together at the time of the 
decedent's death. Despite the wife's inability to recover under either the divorce 
or elective-share statute, the court held: 
We conclude . . .  that the principle that animates both (the equitable­
distribution and elective-share] statutes is that a spouse may acquire an in­
terest in marital property by virtue of the mutuality of efforts during mar­
riage that contribute to the creation, acquisition, and preservation of such 
property. This principle, primarily equitable in nature, is derived from no­
tions of fairness, common decency, and good faith. Further, we are con­
vinced that these laws do not reflect a legislative intent to extinguish the 
property entitlement of a spouse who finds himself or herself beyond the 
reach of either statute because the marriage has realistically but not legally 
ended at the time of the other's death. 
In the exercise of their common-law jurisdiction, courts should seek to 
effectuate sound public policy and mold the law to embody the societal val­
ues that are exemplified by such public policy . . . .  
The constructive trust, we believe, is an appropriate equitable remedy in 
this type of case . . .  [that] should be invoked and imposed on the marital 
property under the control of the executor of [the husband's] estate . . .  to 
avoid the unjust enrichment that would occur if the marital property devolv­
ing to [the husband's] estate included the share beneficially belonging to [the 
wife]. 
In a footnote, the court noted that efforts were currently pending in the New 
Jersey legislature to correct the problem of a surviving spouse who falls outside 
the protection of both statutes. 
5 1 .  In the late Eighteenth Century, Jeremy Bentham sought, unsuccessfully, 
to reform the English common-law system by writing a model law of succession. 
Some of his ideas seem to reflect a conception of marriage as a partnership. He 
wrote: 
Article I. No distinction between the sexes; what is said of one extends to 
the other. The portion of the one shall be always equal to that of the other. 
Reason.- Good of equality . . . .  
Article II. After the husband's death, the widow shall retain half the 
common property; unless some different arrangement was made by the 
marriage contract. 
J. Bentham, supra note 3, at 1 78-79 (Emphasis added). 
52. M. Glendon, The Transformation of Family Law 1 3 1  ( 1989). 
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marital bargain under which the partners agree that each is to 
enjoy a half interest in the economic production of the marriage, 
that is, in the property nominally acquired by and titled in the 
sole name of either partner during the marriage (other than in 
property acquired by gift or inheritance). A decedent who disin­
herits his or her surviving spouse is seen as having reneged on the 
bargain. Sometimes the theory is visualized in restitutionary 
terms, a return-of-contribution notion. Under this approach, the 
law grants each spouse an entitlement to compensation for non­
monetary contributions to the marital enterprise, as "a recogni­
tion of the activity of one spouse in the home and to compensate 
not only for this activity but for opportunities lost."53 Sometimes 
the theory is stated in aspirational and behavior-shaping terms: 
[T]he ideal to which marriage aspires [is] that of equal partner­
ships between spouses who share resources, responsibilities, and 
risks . . . .  
From a policy standpoint, this partnership framework is desira­
ble both because it encourages cooperative commitments between 
spouses and because it serves broader egalitarian and caretaking 
objectives. In effect, sharing principles hold promise for bridging 
traditional public/private divisions between family and market. A 
partnership model can cushion the impact of persistent gender bi­
ases in couples' private allocation of homemaking tasks and in the 
public allocation of salaries and benefits. By sharing their total re­
sources, families can spread the risks and benefits of sex-linked 
roles, the remnants of a socioeconomic system that makes it difficult 
for any one individual to accommodate a full work and family 
life . . . .  
Not only do partnership principles promote gender equality; they 
also support caretaking commitments toward children and elderly 
dependents. 54 
Part I of this lecture was devoted to a description of the rules 
that allocate original ownership in a marriage. The fundamental 
divergence between the community-property and separate-prop-
53. !d. 
54. Rhode & Minow, Reforming the Questions, Questioning the Reforms, in 
Divorce Reform at the Crossroads 1 9 1 ,  198-99 (S. Sugarman & H. Kay eds. 
1 990). 
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erty systems reveals that the community-property system imple­
ments the partnership theory while the separate-property system 
does not. 
B. Equitable Distribution Upon Divorce55 
The community-property system directly treats a couple's en­
terprise as collaborative, by granting each spouse a one-half inter­
est in the earnings of the other immediately upon acquisition. 
Today all or nearly all56 of the separate-property states also give 
effect, or purport to give effect, to the partnership theory at disso­
lution of a marriage upon divorce. 57 Under so-called equitable 
distribution statutes, courts are given broad discretion "to assign 
55. For a collection of excellent essays on divorce-reform laws, see Divorce 
Reform at the Crossroads (S. Sugarman & H. Kay eds. 1 990). 
56. In 1989, Professor Oldham reported that "Mississippi is the only state 
that has not clearly accepted [the equitable-distribution] system. See Jones v. 
Jones, 532 So.2d 574 (Miss. 1988)." Oldham, Tracing, Commingling, and Trans­
mutation, 23 Fam. L.Q. 2 19, 2 19  n. 1 ( 1989). 
For a fascinating account of how this system swept the country, see Glendon, 
Property Rights Upon Dissolution of Marriages and Informal Unions, in The 
Cambridge Lectures 245 (N. Eastham & B. Krivy eds. 198 1). 
57. In Rothman v. Rothman, 320 A.2d 496 (N.J. 1974), a landmark case 
interpreting New Jersey's equitable-distribution statute, the New Jersey Supreme 
Court stated: 
The statute we are considering authorizes the courts, upon divorce, to divide 
marital assets equitably between the spouses . . . .  [T]he enactment seeks to 
right what many have felt to be a grave wrong. It gives recognition to the 
essential supportive role played by the wife in the home, acknowledging that 
as homemaker, wife and mother she should clearly be entitled to a share of 
family assets accumulated during the marriage. Thus the division of prop­
erty upon divorce is responsive to the concept that marriage is a shared 
enterprise, a joint undertaking, that in many ways it is akin to a partnership. 
Only if it is clearly understood that far more than economic factors are in­
volved, will the resulting distribution be equitable within the true intent and 
meaning of the statute . . . .  The widely pervasive effect this remedial legisla­
tion will almost certainly have throughout our society betokens its great 
significance. 
Id. at 501-02. Although in this early equitable-distribution case, the court re­
fused to establish a presumptive division of marital assets on a 50/50 basis, see id. 
at 503 n.6, many courts today do indulge in such a presumption of equal division, 
and many of the more recently enacted statutes explicitly do so also. See J. Greg­
ory, The Law of Equitable Distribution � 8.03 (1989). 
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to either spouse property acquired during the marriage, irrespec­
tive of title, taking into account the circumstances of the particu­
lar case and recognizing the value of the contributions of a 
nonworking spouse or homemaker to the acquisition of that prop­
erty. Simply stated, the system of equitable distribution views 
marriage as essentially a shared enterprise or joint undertaking in 
the nature of a partnership to which both spouses contribute -
directly and indirectly, financially and nonfinancially - the fruits 
of which are distributable at divorce. "58 
The equitable-distribution scheme was first introduced by the 
Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act (UMDA). As originally 
promulgated in 1970, the UMDA required that "marital" prop­
erty be distinguished from "nonmarital," or "separate" property. 
Only the former was subject to distribution at divorce. This dis­
tinction, which was drawn from community-property law and 
generally corresponds to community and separate property, cre­
ated various characterization problems. For example, are in­
creases in value of admittedly nonmarital property during 
marriage marital or nonmarital? The statute's approach to char­
acterization was similar to that in a community of acquests re­
gime: a presumption that all assets acquired by either spouse 
during marriage are marital. Several exceptions to this presump­
tion existed: (1) assets that either spouse brought to the marriage, 
including assets that could be traced back to such assets; (2) as­
sets that either spouse acquired during marriage other than from 
earnings; and (3) assets that both spouses agreed to exclude from 
distribution upon dissolution of their marriage. 
In response to characterization problems that the marital! 
nonmarital assets dichotomy created, the UMDA was subse­
quently amended to abolish that distinction. The UMDA now 
describes the property subject to distribution as "property and 
assets belonging to either [spouse] or both however and whenever 
acquired . . . . "59 This provision creates what is called a "hotch-
58. J. Gregory, supra note 57, � 1 .03 at 1-6. 
59. UMDA § 307. 
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pot" property scheme. This change eliminates the characteriza­
tion problem, but it makes the question how the property should 
be distributed more difficult. 60 
Among the states that have not adopted UMDA, there are 
considerable differences in the statutes concerning what property 
is subject to division.61 Once the court has determined what 
property is divisible, however, it has power to order the title-hold­
ing spouse to transfer all or a part of divisible assets to the other 
spouse. The statutes differ regarding the criteria by which courts 
are to make distributive decisions, but, in general, equitable distri­
bution is characterized by a considerable degree of judicial discre­
tion. This feature is an important difference between the 
equitable-distribution and community-property regimes. Despite 
this difference, however, equitable distribution approximates 
community property at divorce by implementing the partnership 
theory.62 The widespread adoption of equitable-distribution stat­
utes is a source of pressure on separate-property states to imple­
ment the partnership theory in the other circumstances in which 
spousal property rights loom large - disinheritance at death. 
C. Protection Against Disinheritance 
1 . CONVENTIONAL ELECTIVE-SHARE LAW 
All but one of the separate-property states63 have decided that 
disinheritance of the surviving spouse at death is one of the few 
60. See Levy, An Introduction to Divorce-Property Issues, 23 Fam. L.Q. 147, 
1 5 1 -56, 1 59-6 1 ( 1989). 
6 1 .  The various schemes are canvassed, state-by-state, in J. Gregory, supra 
note 56; J. Oldham, Divorce, Separation and the Distribution of Property ( 1989); 
and L. Golden, Equitable Distribution of Property (1983). 
62. See Comment, The Development of Sharing Principles in Common Law 
Marital Property States, 28 UCLA L. Rev. 1269 (198 1). 
63. Georgia is the only separate-property state lacking an elective-share stat­
ute. For a discussion of the reasons for Georgia's position, including its unusual 
"year's support" practice, and an argument that elective-share statutes are gener­
ally unnecessary, see Chaffin, A Reappraisal of the Wealth Transmission Process: 
The Surviving Spouse, Year's Support and Intestate Succession, 10 Ga. L. Rev. 
447 ( 1976). For an opposing view, see Note, Preventing Spousal Disinheritance in 
Georgia, 19  Ga. L. Rev. 427 ( 1985). 
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instances in which the decedent's testamentary freedom with re­
spect to title-based ownership interests must be curtailed. 64 No 
matter what the decedent's intent, the separate-property states 
recognize that the surviving spouse has a claim to some portion of 
the decedent's estate. These statutes, which in all but a few states 
have replaced the common-law estates of dower and curtesy, 65 
provide the spouse a so-called "forced" share. Because the forced 
share is expressed as an option that the survivor can elect or let 
lapse during the administration of the decedent's estate, and not 
as a retitling of the decedent's property that automatically occurs 
at death, the more descriptive term "elective" share is often used. 
Elective-share law in the separate-property states has not 
caught up to the partnership theory of marriage. Under typical 
American elective-share law, including the elective share pro­
vided by the pre-1990 UPC, a surviving spouse is granted a right 
to claim a one-third share of the decedent's estate, not a right to 
claim the one-half share of the couple's combined assets that the 
partnership theory would imply. 
To illustrate the discrepancy between the partnership theory 
and conventional elective-share law, consider first a long-term 
marriage, in which the couple's combined assets were accumu­
lated mostly during the course of the marriage. The elective­
share fraction of one-third of the decedent's estate plainly does 
64. A unique feature of community-property regimes is that a decedent's sur­
viving spouse is not seen as needing "protection" against disinheritance by means 
of a so-called "elective" share in the estate of the deceased spouse. The survivor 
already owns a half interest in the fruits of the marriage. No elective share is 
provided with respect to the separate or individual property of the other spouse 
because that property was not attributable to the fruits of the marriage. Contri­
bution having been rewarded, the decedent can be allowed unfettered power of 
disposition over his or her separate or individual property and over his or her 
half of the community or marital property. 
65. The Restatement of Property lists five jurisdictions as providing the sur­
viving spouse a dower or dower-like interest in the decedent's real property -
Arkansas, District of Columbia, Kentucky, Ohio, and West Virginia. See Re­
statement (Second) of Property (Donative Transfers) § 34. 1 stat. note ( 1992). 
Dower, however, was abolished in West Virginia in 1992 incident to enactment 
of the UPC's accrual-type elective share, as described infra text accompanying 
notes 68-80. 
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not implement a partnership principle. The actual result is gov­
erned by which spouse happens to die first and by how the prop­
erty accumulated during the marriage was nominally titled. 
Consider Harry and Wilma. Assume that Harry and Wilma 
were married in their twenties or early thirties. They never di­
vorced, and Harry died somewhat prematurely at age, say, 62, 
survived by Wilma. For whatever reason, Harry left a will en­
tirely disinheriting Wilma. Throughout their long marriage, the 
couple managed to accumulate assets worth $600,000, marking 
them as a somewhat affluent but hardly wealthy couple. 
Under conventional elective-share law, Wilma's ultimate enti­
tlement is governed by the manner in which these $600,000 in 
assets were nominally titled as between them. Wilma could end 
up significantly better off or significantly less well off than a 50/50 
principle would suggest. The reason is that under conventional 
elective-share law, Wilma has a claim to one-third of Harry's 
"estate." 
In a marriage in which the marital assets were disproportion­
ately titled in the decedent's name, as is typical in a traditional 
support marriage in which the husband dies first, conventional 
elective-share law often entitles the survivor to less than an equal 
share. Thus, if Harry "owned" all $600,000 of the marital assets, 
Wilma's claim against Harry's estate would only be for $200,000 
- well below Wilma's $300,000 entitlement produced by the 
partnership principle. If Harry "owned" $500,000 of the marital 
assets, Wilma's claim would only be for $ 166,500 ( 113 of 
$500,000), which when combined with Wilma's "own" $ 100,000 
yields a less-than-equal share of $266,500 for Wilma - still below 
the $300,000 figure produced by the partnership principle. 
In a marriage in which the marital assets were more or less 
equally titled, conventional elective-share law grants the survivor 
a right to take a disproportionately large share. If Harry and 
Wilma each owned $300,000, Wilma is still granted a claim for an 
additional $ 100,000. 
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Finally, in a marriage in which the marital assets were dispro­
portionately titled in the survivor's name, conventional elective­
share law entitles the survivor to compound the disproportion. If 
only $200,000 were titled in Harry's name, Wilma would still 
have a claim against Harry's estate for $66,667 (1!3 of $200,000), 
even though Wilma was already overcompensated as measured 
by the partnership theory. 
I should now like to draw attention to a very different sort of 
marriage - a short-term marriage, particularly the short-term 
marriage later in life, in which each spouse typically comes into 
the marriage with assets derived from a former marriage. In 
these marriages, the one-third fraction of the decedent's estate far 
exceeds a 50/50 division of assets acquired during the marriage. 
To illustrate this sort of marriage, let us turn to the case of 
Wilma and Sam. Suppose that a few years after Harry's death, 
Wilma married Sam. Suppose that both Wilma and Sam were in 
their mid-to-later sixties when they were married. Then suppose 
that after a few years of marriage - five, let us say -, Wilma 
died survived by Sam. Assume further that both Wilma and Sam 
have adult children and a few grandchildren by their prior mar­
riages, and that each would prefer to leave most or all of his or 
her property to those children. 
Assuming that Wilma and Sam entered their marriage equally 
well off, each with $300,000 in assets, conventional elective-share 
law, for reasons that are not immediately apparently, gives the 
survivor, Sam, a right to shrink Wilma's estate (and hence the 
share of Wilma's children by her prior marriage to Harry) by 
$100,000 (reducing it to $200,000) while supplementing Sam's as­
sets (which will likely go to Sam's children by his prior marriage) 
by $100,000 (increasing their value to $400,000). 
In this type of marriage, in other words, conventional elective­
share law basically rewards the children of the remarried spouse 
who manages to outlive the other, arranging for those children a 
windfall share of one-third of the "loser's" estate. The "winning" 
spouse - the one who chanced to survive - gains a windfall, for 
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this "winner" is unlikely to have made a contribution, monetary 
or otherwise, to the "loser's" wealth remotely worth one-third. 
How prevalent are marriages like that between Wilma and Sam 
- the remarriage later in life ending in the death of one of the 
partners a few years later? Plainly, such marriages do not affect a 
high proportion of the widowed and divorced population. Never­
theless, government data suggest that the incidence of such mar­
riages may not be insignificant. 66 Equally to the point, when such 
marriages occur, conventional elective-share law renders results 
that are dramatically inconsistent with the partnership theory of 
marriage. That these results are seen as unjust by the children of 
the decedent's former marriage is both unsurprising and well doc-
66. Government data reveal that, within the widowed and divorced popula­
tion at large, not disaggregated by age, about 2 1 %  of widowed men and about 
8% of widowed women remarry; and about 83% of divorced men and 78% of 
divorced women remarry. See U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Services, Pub. No. 
89- 1923, Remarriages and Subsequent Divorces - United States 1 2  ( 1989). The 
average (mean) ages at the time of remarriage of widowed men and women have 
steadily increased from 57.7 in 1970 to 60.2 in 1983 for men and from 50.3 in 
1 970 to 52.6 in 1 983 for women. The average (mean) ages at remarriage of di­
vorced men and women have also steadily increased, but the ages are, of course, 
much lower. The average (mean) ages increased from 36.7 in 1 970 to 37.3 in 
1983 for men and from 32.8 in 1970 to 33.7 in 1983 for women. Id., tbl. 4, at 24. 
In 1 983, the average intervals between becoming widowed and remarriage for 
the 65-and-older age group were 3.6 years for men and 7.9 years for women. The 
average intervals between divorce and remarriage for the same age group were 
6.3 years for men and 10.4 years for women. Id. at 1 3. 
Within the 65-and-older population, 2.62% of divorced men and .05% of di­
vorced women remarried during 1983. During that same year, 1 .68% of wid­
owed men age 65 and older and .02% of women age 65 and older remarried. 
Within the divorced population ages 60 to 64 for that same year, 4.93% of di­
vorced men and 1 .29% of divorced women remarried; figures were not given for 
the widowed population ages 60 to 64 for that or any other year. The remarriage 
rates within the 65-and-older divorced and widowed segments of the population 
have been treading downward, but not in a straight line. The data show peaks 
and valleys over the course of the 1970-83 period. The peak occurred during the 
year 1 975, when 3. 14% of divorced men, .09 1 %  of divorced women, 1 .95% of 
widowed men, and .02 1 %  of widowed women remarried. Data for 1 975 for the 
60 to 64 years age group were not reported. /d., Table 3, at 23. 
These marriage rates, of course, do not reveal the remarriage rates of divorced 
or widowed men and women age 65 and older or 60 to 64; they merely reveal the 
remarriage rates for a given year. Because such remarriages accumulate within 
the population, the incidence of remarriage later in life appears to be significant. 
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umented in the elective-share case law. 67 In a case like that of 
Wilma and Sam - the short-term, late-in-life marriage, which 
produces no children -, a decedent who for all intents and pur­
poses disinherits the surviving spouse may not be acting so much 
from malice or spite toward the surviving spouse, but from a felt 
higher obligation to the children of his or her former, long-term 
marriage. 
2. IMPLEMENTING THE PARTNERSHIP THEORY 
The stage is now set for rethinking elective-share law. Without 
a theory to support it, conventional elective-share law is untena­
ble. This alone does not necessarily make it vulnerable to change. 
Unsatisfactory though it may be, it will likely remain in place 
unless a viable system is brought forth to replace it. 
The system that, in time, seems sure to replace it is one that 
implements the partnership theory of marriage. The pressure to 
bring elective-share law into line with the partnership theory can 
only increase. Spurred by the Uniform Marital Property Act and 
the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act, the 1990 revisions of the 
Uniform Probate Code are now in place to offer a means of re­
pairing elective-share law. 
It is one thing to speak of implementing the partnership theory 
and another thing to work out a model for doing it. In seeking to 
implement the partnership theory, the Joint Editorial Board con­
sidered three possible approaches. The first was to use the 
UMDA's equitable-distribution system for divorce law, z: e. to ex­
tend that system into the area of the elective share. The second 
67. See W. Macdonald, Fraud on the Widow's Share 1 56-57 (1 960). Of the 
elective-share cases in the law reports up to the time of writing and in which the 
author could identify the relationships, more than half pitted children of a former 
marriage against a later spouse. 
Statistically, "on average, women ending first marriages had 1 .06 children 
under 1 8  years, those ending second marriages had 0.64 children, and those end­
ing third marriages had 0.36 children. These differences are due at least in part to 
the fact that most children are born into first marriages and may not be men­
tioned on divorce records of subsequent marriages unless custody becomes an 
issue." U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Services, supra note 66, at 3. 
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was to adopt a community-property system similar to the 
UMPA, except that it would attach only at death. The third, the 
one adopted, was to establish an accrual system that would ap­
proximate a fifty/fifty split of marital assets. 
Because I have already written about the pros and cons of each 
approach in the Iowa Law Review,68 and because a somewhat 
more extensive treatment appears in the Real Property, Probate, 
and Trust J oumal, 69 I will not go into a lengthy discussion of the 
JEB's analysis here. Briefly, the idea of extending the equitable­
distribution system into the area of elective-share law was re­
jected because of the discretionary and unpredictable nature of 
the results under that system. Also, unlike the divorce context, 
where both parties are still alive and can testify, only the survi­
vor's side of the story can be told in the elective-share context. 
The idea of imposing a deferred community-property elective 
share seemed a far better approach. Under this approach, the 
surviving spouse would have a right to claim a 50% share of that 
portion of the couple's combined assets that were acquired during 
the marriage other than by gift or inheritance. The disadvantage 
of this system is that it requires post-death classification of the 
couple's property to determine which is community and which is 
separate. Over a marriage of any length, much property that was 
separate property is likely to be commingled to such an extent 
that tracing to its source would prove administratively difficult. 70 
Unlike their community-property counterparts, marital partners 
68. Waggoner, The Multiple-Marriage Society and Spousal Rights under the 
Revised Uniform Probate Code, 76 Iowa L. Rev. 223 ( 199 1). 
69. Waggoner, Spousal Rights in Our Multiple-Marriage Society: The Revised 
Uniform Probate Code, 26 Real Prop., Prob. & Tr. J .  683 (1992). 
70. See, e.g., I. Quinn, supra note 46, at 8 1 -82. Speaking of married partners 
in which both have paychecks, the author writes: 
Poolers put all the money into a common pot. Splitters keep their own sepa­
rate accounts. Which you choose is a matter of soul, not of finance. Poolers 
think that sharing is what a marriage is all about. Splitters hold to their own 
independence within the marriage. The previously married often split but 
sometimes pool. The first-time married often pool but sometimes split. It's 
so unpredictable that even your best friend might surprise you. Over time, 
and if the marriage goes well, splitters usually turn into spoolers, splitting 
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in title-based states are not put on notice regarding the risk in­
volved in not maintaining adequate records. The administrative 
difficulty is also arguably greater in the elective-share context 
than in the divorce context, where by definition the duration of 
the marriage is shorter than it would have been had the marriage 
ended in disinheritance at death. Finally, it is important to un­
derstand that, to the extent that presumptions would have to be 
imposed to resolve close questions, a deferred community-prop­
erty elective-share system would not yield an accurate result 
anyway.7 1  
In the end, the UPC adopted a more mechanical system that 
implements the partnership theory by approximation. 72 The 
UPC's system, which can be called an accrual-type elective share, 
seeks to establish an administratively simple system that approxi­
mates the results that would be achieved by a 50/50 split of mari­
tal assets. Under community law, each spouse from the first 
moment of the marriage has a right to 50% of the couple's assets 
that are acquired during the marriage other than by gift or inheri­
tance. The hitch of course is that in the first moments of the 
marriage, little or no such property exists. Growth of each 
spouse's community-property entitlement occurs over time as the 
marriage continues and property is acquired and accumulated; 
some, pooling some, and growing less antsy about who pays for what. (Em­
phasis in original.) 
Of married partners in which only one has a paycheck, the author writes: "Split­
ting is out. Pooling is in. "  
7 1 .  See Levy, A n  Introduction to Divorce-Property Issues, 23 Fam. L.Q. 147, 
1 52-53 (1989) (noting, in the context of equitable-distribution law, that "the 
stronger the presumption [in favor of characterizing all property as marital prop­
erty], the less likely it will be that the spouse who owned nonmarital property at 
marriage or received some during the marriage will try to trace the property or 
funds;" and that the weaker the presumption, the more likely it will be that trac­
ing issues will be litigated.). 
72. The UPC's redesigned elective-share system has been endorsed by the 
Executive Board and by the Assembly of the National Association of Women 
Lawyers. 
For a proposal that divorce law utilize an accrual-type system for division of 
assets, see Sugarman Dividing Financial Interests on Divorce, in Divorce Reform 
at the Crossroads 1 30, 1 59-60 (S. Sugarman & H. Kay eds. 1990). 
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each spouse's 50% share is applied to an upwardly-trending ac­
cumulation of assets. 
The UPC's approximation system operates the other way 
around. Formally, it does not distinguish between property ac­
quired during the marriage and other property, but compensates 
for this informally by applying an upwardly-trending percentage 
to the couple's assets whenever and however acquired. Thus the 
accrual schedule translates into a system that approximates the 
amount of marital versus separate property in marriages of vari­
ous lengths. After five years of marriage, for example, each 
spouse's elective-share percentage is 15%, which is meant to rep­
resent 50% of the marital-assets portion of the couple's property. 
By approximation, this means that 30% of the couple's combined 
assets are treated as having been acquired during the marriage 
and 70% not. After ten years of marriage, the elective-share per­
centage is 30%, which in effect treats 60% of the assets as having 
been acquired during the marriage. After fifteen years of mar­
riage and beyond, the elective-share percentage peaks out at 50%, 
which in effect treats all of the assets as marital assets from that 
point forward. 
The advantage of the UPC system is that it avoids the adminis­
trative difficulties of post-death classification and tracing-to­
source that would be endemic to a deferred-community elective 
share. The trade off is that it does what its name implies - it 
approximates. No approximation system will give precisely accu­
rate results in each given case. We have reason to believe, how­
ever, that the UPC system gives reasonably accurate results in 
nearly all cases and caution again that the other system, the de­
ferred-community system, does not give results that are as accu­
rate as you might think. 73 
Whether implemented by approximation, as in the UPC, or by 
a deferred-community elective share, a partnership-based elective 
share has two main consequences: ( 1) it equalizes assets in a 
73. See Waggoner, supra note 69, at 741 -42. 
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longer-term marriage; and (2) it reduces or eliminates the 
spouse's claim in short-term, late-in-life marriages. The conven­
tional elective share of one-third of the decedent's estate does not 
reward the surviving spouse sufficiently in most instances of long­
term marriages and over-rewards the surviving spouse in short­
term, late-in-life marriages that usually involve a widow and wid­
ower with children by their prior marriages. 
To illustrate this last point, let's return to Wilma and Sam and 
apply the UPC system to their late-in-life marriage. Recall that 
each carne out of their main marriages with about $300,000 in 
assets. This having been a marriage that lasted five years, the 
elective-share percentage prescribed in the statute is 15%.74 
Sam's elective-share entitlement is $90,000 ( 15% of their com­
bined assets of $600,000). But this does not mean that Sam has a 
$90,000 claim against Wilma's estate. Thirty percent of Sam's 
own $300,000 in assets (double the elective-share percentage) 
count in fulfilling Sam's elective-share amount. Since 30% of 
Sam's assets is $90,000, there is no deficiency and hence no claim 
to any of Wilma's assets. 
Although this approach does not eliminate the desirability of a 
premarital agreement in second marriages, it does make such an 
agreement less essential by removing the disincentive to remar­
riage on the part of older widows and widowers that conventional 
elective-share systems now impose. When an older widow and 
widower - each financially independent and each with adult 
children by the prior, main marriage - want to get married, a 
concern that often arises is that the survivor of the two will take a 
large portion of the other's property and deprive the decedent's 
children of their inheritance. As the financial journalist, Jane 
Bryant Quinn, said in a recent book: 
[When older people remarry,] your friends wiii be enchanted. But 
don't be surprised if your children aren't. It's usually not the 
"pater" they worry about, but the patrimony. If your new spouse 
gets your property after your death, he or she is free to cut your 
74. See VPC § 2-20 l (a) ( 1 990). 
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children out. Even if you own assets separately, state inheritance 
laws [referring to elective-share laws, not intestacy laws] usually re­
quire that the spouse get one-third to one-half. 75 
A partnership-based elective share serves to remove that concern. 
3. NEED TO SUPPLEMENT PARTNERSHIP ELECTIVE 
SHARE WITH A SUPPORT THEORY ELEMENT 
As sensible as the partnership theory is, it is not sufficient by 
itself to "do right" by all surviving spouses. One persistent criti­
cism of the partnership theory as applied to divorce law is that it 
often leaves divorced women without an adequate means of sup­
port.76 This is because the traditional division of labor within a 
marriage allows the husband to devote his energy to his career 
while the wife devotes her energy to what the economists call 
"household production." An equal division of assets saved dur­
ing the marriage still leaves the divorced wife far behind in earn­
ing power after a divorce than she would have been had she 
devoted her energy during the marriage to a career. 77 This criti­
cism of divorce law does not apply, of course, to all divorced 
spouses, but mainly to those who come out of the failed marriage 
with diminished work skills. 
The problem is, if anything, more endemic to elective-share 
law, where the surviving spouse is typically beyond working 
years. One of the theories traditionally thought to underlie elec-
75. J. Quinn, supra note 46, at 83.  
76. See, e.g. , L. Weitzman, The Divorce Revolution: The Unexpected Social 
and Economic Consequences for Women and Children in America Ch. 7 ( 1985); 
Krauskopf, Theories of Property Division/Spousal Support: Searching Solutions to 
the Mystery, 23 Fam. L.Q. 253, 27 1 n. 65 ( 1989); McLindon, Separate But Une­
qual: The Economic Disaster of Divorce for Women and Children, 2 1  Fam. L.Q. 
3 5 1 ,  352, 391-92 ( 1987); Rhode & Minow, Reforming the Questions, Questioning 
the Reforms, in Divorce Reform at the Crossroads 191 ,  201-04 (S. Sugarman & 
H. Kay eds. 1 990); Smith, The Partnership Theory of Marriage: A Borrowed Solu­
tion Fails, 68 Texas L. Rev. 689 ( 1 990); Sugarman, Dividing Financial Interests 
on Divorce, in Divorce Reform at the Crossroads 1 30 (S. Sugarman & H. Kay 
eds. 1 990). But see S. Faludi, Backlash 1 -35 ( 199 1). 
77. See Stake, Fostering Private Ordering by Forcing Parties to Bargain: A 
Matrimonial Mandate to Deal with Divorce, 2 L. Rev. J. 1 ,  5-12 ( 199 1). 
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tive-share law involves a post-death duty of support, that is, that 
the spouses' mutual duties of support during their joint lifetimes 
should be continued in some form after death in favor of the sur­
vivor, as a claim on the decedent's estate. 
Conventional elective-share law implements this theory poorly. 
The fixed fraction, whether it is the typical one-third or some 
other fraction, disregards the survivor's actual need. A one-third 
share may be inadequate to the surviving spouse's needs, espe­
cially in a modest estate. On the other hand, in a very large es­
tate, it may go far beyond the survivor's needs. In either a 
modest or a large estate, the survivor may or may not have ample 
independent means, and this factor, too, is disregarded in conven­
tional elective-share law, as it is in intestacy law. The problem is 
not addressed in intestacy law because intestacy affects so many 
estates of small size. Elective-share law can accommodate a more 
individuated system, however, because elections are the exception 
in estate practice. 
The 1990 UPC's elective-share system, therefore, seeks to im­
plement the support theory by granting the survivor a supplemen­
tal elective-share amount related to the survivor's actual needs. 
In implementing a support rationale, the length of the marriage is 
quite irrelevant. Because the duty of support is founded upon 
status, it arises at the time of the marriage. 
The revised UPC implements the support theory by providing 
a supplemental elective-share amount of $50,000.78 This feature 
is not like the lump-sum device used in intestacy law. Here, the 
surviving spouse's own title-based ownership interests, amounts 
shifting to the survivor at the decedent's death, and amounts ow­
ing to the survivor from the decedent's estate under the accrual­
type elective-share apparatus discussed above are counted first to­
ward making up this $50,000 amount. (Amounts going to the 
survivor under the Code's probate exemptions and allowances79 
and the survivor's Social Security and other governmental bene-
78. 1990 UPC § 2-20l (b). 
79. See note 43 supra. 
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fits are not counted, however.) Only if the survivor's assets and 
entitlements are less than the $50,000 minimum is the survivor 
entitled to whatever additional portion of the decedent's estate is 
necessary, up to 100% of it, to bring the survivor's assets and 
entitlements up to that minimum level. 80 
If there could be any complaint about this feature of the UPC 
system, it would be that the $50,000 figure is too low. With aver­
age social security payments added in, $50,000 at current interest 
rates will generate an income stream of only $723 a month 
($8,676 a year), which is only $200 a month above the poverty 
level. The figure of $50,000 is given in brackets in the Code, 
which means that any state is invited to supply a different figure if 
it so chooses. A somewhat higher figure might be quite 
appropriate. 
4. PROTECTION AGAINST WILL SUBSTITUTES 
I would now like to turn to another feature of elective-share 
law. Conventional statutes grant the surviving spouse a right to 
elect a fractional share of the decedent's "estate." In our par­
lance, the term "estate" normally means the probate estate, i. e. , 
the property owned at death and included in the gross estate for 
estate tax purposes under IRC section 2033. 
One of the most troublesome issues under these "estate" stat­
utes is the extent to which spousal elective-share rights extend to 
will substitutes. An elective share is just as ineffective if it applies 
only to the decedent's probate estate as the federal transfer taxes 
would be if there were no gift tax and the estate tax only con­
tained section 2033. The elective-share system would serve only 
as a blueprint for evasion. 
A. COMMON-LAW THEORIES 
"Estate" statutes shift to the judicial system the task of breath­
ing integrity into the elective share. In the earlier part of this 
80. 1990 UPC § 2-207(b), (c). 
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century, the courts only halfheartedly rose to the occasion, by 
adopting one or the other of two approaches: the fraudulent-in­
tent test or the illusory-transfer test. The illusory-transfer test is 
the predominant view. The leading case adopting the illusory­
transfer test is Newman v. Dore,8 1 a New York case that arose in 
the late 1930s. In that case, Ferdinand Straus, an eighty-year-old 
testator, executed trust agreements by which he transferred all his 
real and personal property to his trustees. The trust agreements 
were executed three days before his death and when cross actions 
for dissolution of his marriage were pending. The terms of the 
trusts reserved to Straus the right to the income for life, the 
power to revoke the trusts, and the power to control the trustees 
in all aspects of the trusts' administration; needless to say, 
Straus's wife of four years, a woman in her thirties, received no 
beneficial interest in these trusts. In holding that the trusts were 
part of Straus's estate for purposes of his widow's rights, the New 
York Court of Appeals "judged [the trust] by the substance, not 
by the form." Under this test, "the testator's conveyance is illu­
sory, intended only as a mask for the effective retention by the 
settlor of the property which in form he had conveyed." 
Although it was by no means the first case to have formulated 
this general approach, 82 the decision in Newman v. Dore had sub­
stantial influence on the law in other states. 83 Although promis­
ing in theory, the illusory-transfer doctrine of Newman v. Dore 
has, for the most part, given the surviving spouse very limited 
8 1 .  9 N.E.2d 966 (N.Y. 1 937). 
82. In Gentry v. Bailey, 47 Va. (6 Gratt.) 594 ( 1850), the court observed that 
it was "not at all material by what motive the husband was actuated in making 
the disposition of his property." However, the right given the surviving spouse by 
the election statute was one that "the husband cannot defeat by any contrivance 
for that purpose: . . . . Whatever may be the form of the transaction, if the 
substance of it be a testamentary disposition, it cannot be effectual in relation to 
the wife. If this were otherwise, the statute might be rendered a dead letter at the 
volition of the husband." 
83. In New York, the ruling of the case has been superseded by comprehen­
sive legislation that protects the surviving spouse against specified will substi­
tutes. See N.Y. Est. Powers & Trusts Law § 5-1 . 1 .  
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protection against will substitutes. 84 Among the courts accepting 
the doctrine, one of the most common will substitutes of all, the 
revocable trust with a retained life estate, has been held not to be 
illusory. 85 There was even some doubt that a Totten trust is illu­
sory under the illusory-transfer test. 86 
A breakthrough finally occurred in the important 1984 Massa­
chusetts decision of Sullivan v. Burkin. 87 In an opinion written 
by Justice Herbert Wilkins, the court held that assets held in a 
revocable inter-vivos trust created during the marriage88 is part of 
the estate in determining the surviving spouse's elective share. 
84. The comprehensive work in the field is W. Macdonald, Fraud on the 
Widow's Share ( 1 960). See also Schuyler, Revocable Trusts - Spouses, Creditors 
and Other Predators, 1 974 Inst. on Est. Plan. ch. 13 ;  Annots., 63 A.L.R.4th 1 173 
( 1988); 49 A.L.R.2d 521 ( 1956); Reporter's Note, Restatement (Second) of Prop­
erty (Donative Transfers) § 1 3 .7, at 101- 1 1  ( 1986). 
85. See, e.g., Johnson v. LaGrange State Bank, 383 N.E.2d 1 85 (Ill. 1978) 
(see also Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 1 10 1/2 § 601); Kerwin v. Donaghy, 59 N.E.2d 185 
(Mass. 1945) (prospectively overruled in Sullivan v. Burkin, 460 N.E.2d 572 
(Mass. 1984); Beirne v. Continental-Equitable Trust Co., 16 1  A. 72 1 (Pa. 1 932); 
see Johnson v. Farmers & Merchants Bank, 379 S.E.2d 761 (W.Va. 1989); Re­
statement (Second) of Trusts § 57 cmt. c ( 1 959). In a 1944 Ohio decision, such a 
trust was held ineffective against the claim of a surviving spouse, Bolles v. Toledo 
Trust Co., 58 N.E.2d 381  (Ohio 1944), but the decision was later overruled in 
Smyth v. Cleveland Trust Co., 1 79 N.E.2d 60 (Ohio 196 1). 
On the other hand, the Supreme Court of Maine seemed to indicate that a 
revocable trust with a retained life estate might be "illusory" under the illusory­
transfer doctrine. See Staples v. King, 433 A.2d 407 (Me. 198 1). Maine subse­
quently enacted the augmented-estate concept of the pre-1990 UPC. 
86. Compare Matter of Halpern, 100 N.E.2d 120 (N.Y. 195 1) and Jeruzal's 
Estate v. Jeruzal, 1 30 N.W.2d 473 (Minn. 1 964), with Montgomery v. Michaels, 
301 N.E.2d 465 (Ill. 1 973). 
87. 460 N.E.2d 572 (Mass. 1984). 
88.  The facts in the case were that, in September, 1973, Ernest G. Sullivan 
executed a deed of trust under which he transferred real estate to himself as sole 
trustee. The net income of the trust was payable to him during his life and the 
trustee was instructed to pay to him all or such part of the principal of the trust 
estate as he might request in writing from time to time. He retained the right to 
revoke the trust at any time. On his death, the successor trustee was directed to 
pay the principal and any undistributed income equally to George F. Cronin, Sr., 
and Harold J. Cronin, if they should survive him, which they did. 
The husband died on April 27, 1981 ,  while still trustee of the inter-vivos trust. 
He left a will in which he stated that he "intentionally neglected to make any 
provision for my wife, Mary A. Sullivan and my grandson, Mark Sullivan."  He 
directed that, after the payment of debts, expenses, and all estate taxes levied by 
reason of his death, the residue of his estate should be paid over to the trustee of 
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The court engaged in the frequently applied Massachusetts prac­
tice of prospective overruling, so that the new rule was not applied 
to the Sullivan case itself. For the future, however, the court held 
that "as to any inter vivos trust created or amended after the date 
of this opinion, we announce that the estate of a decedent . . .  
shall include the value of assets held in an inter vivos trust cre­
ated by the deceased spouse as to which the deceased spouse 
alone retained the power during his or her life to direct the dispo­
sition of those trust assets for his or her benefit, as, for example, 
by the exercise of a power of appointment or by revocation of the 
trust. Such a power would be a general power of appointment for 
Federal estate tax purposes . . .  and a "general power" as defined 
in the Restatement (Second) of Property . . . . " More signifi­
cantly, the court also noted: "What we have announced as a rule 
for the future hardly resolves all the problems that may arise." 
The court then ticked off a laundry list of undecided questions, 
questions whose resolution await future case-by-case adjudica­
tion.89 Citing the Uniform Probate Code, the court added that 
"The question . . .  is one that can best be handled by legislation." 
the inter-vivos trust. George F. Cronin, Sr., and Harold J. Cronin were named 
coexecutors of the will. 
Ernest and Mary had been separated for many years. At his death, Ernest 
owned personal property worth approximately $15 ,000. The only asset in the 
trust was a house in Boston, which was sold after his death for approximately 
$85,000. 
89. In full, the court's statement was: 
There may be a different rule if some or all of the trust assets were conveyed 
to such a trust by a third person . . . .  We have not, of course, dealt with a 
case in which the power of appointment is held jointly with another person. 
If the surviving spouse assented to the creation of the inter vivos trust, per­
haps the rule we announce would not apply. We have not discussed which 
assets should be used to satisfy a surviving spouse's claim. We have not 
discussed the question whether a surviving spouse's interest in the intestate 
estate of a deceased spouse should reflect the value of assets held in an inter 
vivos trust created by the intestate spouse over which he or she had a gen­
eral power of appointment. That situation and the one before us, however, 
do not seem readily distinguishable. A general power of appointment over 
assets in a trust created by a third person is said to present a different situa­
tion. Restatement (Second) of Property, Supplement to Tent. Draft No. 5, 
reporter's note to § 13 .7  at 29 (1 982). Nor have we dealt with other assets 
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B. AUGMENTED-EsTATE LEGISLATION 
It seems clear that courts will now be more and more inclined 
to protect surviving spouses against disinheritance by will substi­
tute. This movement, begun by Sullivan, can only be boosted by 
the adoption of a similar approach published in 1986 and 1992 in 
the Restatement (Second) of Property (Donative Transfers).90 
If this is the case, then it would seem to be far preferable to 
enact legislation along the lines of the augmented-estate concept 
of the Uniform Probate Code or some similar model and be done 
with it, so that estate planners know what the rules are. Other­
wise, the rules will be developed on a case-by-case basis and it 
may take years or decades before the full scope of the spouse's 
protection becomes clarified in a particular jurisdiction. 
Under the UPC, the surviving spouse's elective-share percent­
age is applied to the augmented estate. The augmented estate 
serves two basic functions. By combining the couple's assets, it 
plays a crucial part under the 1990 Code in implementing the 
partnership theory. The other function is to provide a means of 
protecting the spouse against evasion by will substitute. To these 
ends, the augmented estate consists of the sum of the values of 
four components: (1) the decedent's net probate estate; (2) the 
decedent's reclaimable estate; (3) property to which the surviving 
spouse succeeds by reason of the decedent's death other than 
from the decedent's probate estate; and (4) property owned by the 
surviving spouse and amounts that would have been included in 
not passing by will, such as a trust created before the marriage or insurance 
policies over which a deceased spouse had control. 
Sullivan, 460 N.E.2d at 577-78. 
90. Section 34. 1 of the Restatement provides: 
(3) An inter vivos donative transfer to others than the donor's spouse that 
is a substitute for a will, or that is revocable by the donor at the time of the 
donor's death, is subject to spousal rights of the donor's spouse in the trans­
ferred property that would accrue to the donor's spouse on the donor's 
death if the transfer had been made by the donor's will. 
See also id. § 1 3.7, the comment to which states that this provision is not re­
stricted to transfers that took place during the marriage. 
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the surviving spouse's reclaimable estate had the spouse prede­
ceased the decedent. 
The function of protecting the spouse against evasion by will 
substitute is performed by the reclaimable-estate component of 
the augmented estate. The concept of providing in the statute 
itself a list of will substitutes to be subjected to the surviving 
spouse's elective share9 1 was pioneered by legislation in New 
York and Pennsylvania and adopted by the pre-1990 UPC. 
The 1990 UPC revisions sought to strengthen the reclaimable­
estate component. The pre-1990 version contained several loop­
holes. The most important of these was life insurance that the 
decedent purchased, naming someone other than his or her 
spouse as the beneficiary. Under the 1990 revision, proceeds of 
these policies are included in the reclaimable estate. 
The other important feature of the 1990 revision is that the 
reclaimable estate now includes property that is subject to a pres­
ently exercisable general power of appointment held solely by the 
decedent. 92 Such powers are viewed as substantively indistin­
guishable from outright ownership. The power need not have 
been created by the decedent and need not have been conferred 
on or retained by the decedent during the marriage. The dece­
dent need only have held the power immediately prior to his or 
her death or have exercised or released the power in favor of 
someone other than the decedent, the decedent's estate, or the 
decedent's spouse while married to the spouse and during the 
two-year period next preceding the decedent's death. 
9 1 .  The UPC's list is contained in § 2-202(b)(2). 
92. The term "presently exercisable general power of appointment" is a de­
fined term and includes a reserved power of revocation in a revocable trust. See 
Restatement (Second) of Property (Donative Transfers) § 1 1 . 1  cmt. c & illus. 5 
( 1 986); Sullivan v. Burkin, 460 N.E.2d 572 (Mass. 1984). 
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IV. W HO IS A SPOUSE? 
For the fourth and final segment of this lecture, I should like to 
discuss a question you might not immediately think is a question 
- who qualifies as a "spouse"? 
The rights we have been discussing are granted to the person 
who holds the status of spouse. Spousal status is what grants the 
person a right to an intestate share and the right to elect a forced 
share if dissatisfied with the decedent's estate plan. Spousal status 
is also what grants original ownership of half the property ac­
quired during the marriage in the community-property states. 
Pinning these rights on status is not only beneficial to the spouse, 
but also efficient for society. It means that spouses can claim 
these rights without having to prove anything about the underly­
ing details or commitment of their relationships.93 The mar­
riage certificate itself qualifies the person for what the law allows. 
93. A few states, by statute, bar the surviving spouse from taking for deser­
tion or adultery. See Ky. Rev. Stat. § 392.090 (spouse barred if spouse "leaves 
the other and lives in adultery," unless the spouses "afterward become reconciled 
and live together as husband and wife"); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 560: 19  (spouse 
barred "if at the time of the death of either husband or wife, the decedent was 
justifiably living apart from the surviving husband or wife because such survivor 
was or had been guilty of conduct which constitutes cause for divorce"); N.Y. 
Est. Powers & Trusts Law § 5 - 1 .2 (spouse barred if spouse "abandoned the de­
ceased spouse, and such abandonment continued until the time of death" or if the 
spouse "who, having the duty to support the other spouse, failed or refused to 
provide for such spouse though he or she had the means or ability to do so, 
unless such marital duty was resumed and continued until the death of the 
spouse having the need of support"); 20 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 2 106 (spouse barred 
"who, for one year or upwards previous to the death of the other spouse, has 
wilfully neglected or refused to perform the duty to support the other spouse, or 
who for one year or upwards has wilfully and maliciously deserted the other 
spouse"); Va. Code § 64. 1 -23 (spouse barred if spouse "wilfully desert[s] or aban­
don[s] his or her consort and such desertion or abandonment continues until the 
death of the consort"). See also Haw. Rev. Stat. § 533-9. 
A few courts, without statutory authority to vary the rights provided to surviv­
ing spouses, have denied claims against decedents' estates by persons who were 
lawfully married to the decedents when they died. See, e.g. , Estate of Abila, 1 97 
P.2d 10 (Cal. 1 948) (wife barred because interlocutory decree of divorce, granted 
to decedent before his death, terminated decedent's obligation of support, though 
it did not dissolve the marriage). 
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As my final topic, I want to turn to the situation of the unmar­
ried cohabitor or domestic partner. Unmarried cohabitors or do­
mestic partners lack marital status and hence the automatic 
rights granted to spouses. 
When a domestic partner dies, the status law grants the surviv­
ing partner none of the rights surveyed in the first three parts of 
this lecture. If the decedent died intestate, the decedent's surviv­
ing partner receives no intestate share and receives no right to 
elect against the decedent's will. Intestate-succession law gives a 
surviving spouse a large intestate share on the theory of imputed 
or attributed intent - the law deduces that most decedents (as­
suming a sound marriage) would have wanted to leave everything 
to the survivor or at least a substantial enough portion to give the 
survivor economic security. Regarding unmarried couples, the 
law grants the survivor no share at all; the omission treats the 
surviving partner as no more a natural object of the decedent's 
bounty than a complete stranger. Elective-share law gives a dis­
inherited surviving spouse a right to a certain fraction of the dece­
dent's property, whether the decedent wanted the survivor to 
have anything or not. The claim is based on either a right to 
support or a financial partnership theory or, more conventionally, 
a carryover from common-law dower. Regarding unmarried 
couples, the law grants the survivor no right against being disin­
herited, thus treating the surviving partner as having contributed 
nothing to the decedent's wealth. 
Who are these domestic partners and what do we know about 
them? Actually, we are beginning to know a fair amount.94 As 
of 1990, according to Census Bureau estimates, there were nearly 
94. Much of the demographic information in the following pages is drawn 
from Sweet & Bumpass, Disruption of Marital and Cohabitation Relationships: A 
Social-Demographic Perspective, Working Paper No. 32 (Nat'l Survey of Families 
and Households, 1990); Bumpass, What's Happening to the Family? Interactions 
Between Demographic and Institutional Change, 27 Demography 483 ( 1 990); 
Bumpass, Sweet & Cherlin, The Role of Cohabitation in Declining Rates of Mar­
riage, Working Paper No. 5 (Nat'l Survey of Families and Households, 1989). 
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3 million cohabiting couples in the United States,95 as compared 
with only about 450,000 such couples in 1960. The number of 
these arrangements increased significantly in the 1970s and 80s 
and continues to increase in the 90s. Of course, the term "cohab­
iting couple" is itself indeterminate. Is it restricted to couples 
whose only household is their shared one? Or, does it also in­
clude other, less clear examples such as the yuppie who has an 
apartment but lives for days, weeks, or months on end at the 
other's apartment? The statistics we have count only those who 
share a single household. 
Although at the current time, only 4% of all Americans age 19 
and older are cohabiting, the percentage is far higher at the 
younger ages. In the age 19 to 34 category, about one in seven 
never-married and about one in four formerly married persons 
are currently cohabiting. As might be expected, the rates are 
lower for middle-aged and older people. Fewer than 5% of un­
married persons in their SO's and about 1% of those 60 and older 
are cohabiting. 
In recent years, about 42% of those marrying for the first time 
cohabited at some time prior to their marriage, mostly with their 
first spouse only, and about three-fifths of those entering second 
marriages cohabited between their first and second marriages. 
The most important statistic for spousal-rights law is that for 
most people cohabitation is a temporary or short-term state. The 
parties either break up or get married fairly quickly. By about 
one and one-half years, half the cohabiting couples have either 
married or broken up. Only about 10% remain cohabiting after 
five years. This does not mean, however, that at any point in time 
there exist only a few longer-term or marriage-like cohabitations. 
The longer-term cohabitations tend to accumulate in the popula­
tion. Twenty percent of cohabiting couples, in fact, have lived 
together for five or more years. Many are gay or lesbian couples 
for whom marriage is not an option. But most are heterosexual 
95. See Newsweek, March 23, 1 992, at 62. 
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couples who, for one reason or another, remain together without 
marrying. The duration of cohabiting unions is longer among 
persons previously married. Also, children are more frequently 
present in such unions than you might think. Demographers 
have reported that children are present in 40% of cohabiting 
households. This breaks down to one-third of the never-married 
householders and almost half of the previously married house­
holders. More significantly, 
one-sixth of never-married cohabiting couples have a child that was 
born since they began living together. . . . [T]his represents a signif­
icant component of unmarried births (about a quarter) that are not 
born into single-parent households. 
Further, the children in cohabiting households are not all young 
children . . . .  [A] quarter of the households with children have chil­
dren age 10 or older; mostly living with previously-married parents. 
In thinking about the meaning of cohabitation and the dynamics of 
cohabiting households, it is critical to keep in mind that issues of 
parenting and step-parenting are very much a part of the picture. 96 
The longer-term cohabitations are the ones that tend to find 
their way into the legal system. Like married couples, this hap­
pens upon disinheritance at death or, more commonly, the delib­
erate decision of one of the parties to terminate the relationship. 
The unmarried-cohabitors cases that come to public attention 
nearly always involve a defendant who is a wealthy celebrity, en­
tertainer, or professional athlete. But the less celebrated come to 
court also. As a Houston divorce attorney remarked: "You don't 
need millions of dollars for people to fight. Give two people a 
house worth $200,000 and they'll consider an action. "97 
These suits are sometimes grounded on a common-law mar­
riage claim, but, when that claim is unavailable, because the state 
does not recognize common-law marriages or because the ar­
rangement does not fit within the criteria, they can still go for-
96. Bumpass, Sweet & Cherlin, supra note 94, at 10. 
97. Taylor, Increased Mobility Adds to Common Law Claims, Nat'! L.J., 
Aug. 14, 1989, at 24. 
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ward as a "palimony suit."98 Not surprisingly, as I said, most of 
the cases arise in the context of a dissolution during life. Claims 
arising at death are less common because, if the partners remain 
devoted to one another, the surviving partner is probably pro­
vided for in the decedent's will or other parts of the estate plan. 99 
Therefore, it is less usual for cases to arise in which a surviving 
partner is making a claim to a share of a decedent's estate, but 
such cases do arise. 100 
98. The term "palimony" is misleading because the plaintiff is usually seek­
ing a division of the couple's property, not an award of periodic payments similar 
to alimony. 
99. In speaking of the power of testation, Jeremy Bentham noted that "a 
man . . .  should have the means of cultivating the hopes and rewarding the care 
of . . .  a woman who, but for the omission of a ceremony, would be called his 
widow . . . .  " J. Bentham, supra note 3, at 1 85-86. 
See generally, however, deFuria, Testamentary Gifts Resulting from Meretri­
cious Relationships: Undue Influence or Natural Beneficence?, 64 Notre Dame L. 
Rev. 200 (1989) ("[Although only] a few courts [raise] a rebuttable presumption 
of undue influence . . .  whenever the testator willed his estate to a meretricious 
partner . . .  , [m]any more courts emphasized that such a relationship raised a 
significant suspicion of undue influence, which would be closely scrutinized."); 
Sherman, Undue Influence and the Homosexual Testator, 42 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 225 
(1981)  ("[T]here is at least some evidence to suggest that a homosexual testator 
who bequeaths the bulk of his estate to his lover stands in greater risk of having 
his testamentary plans overturned than does a heterosexual testator who be­
queaths the bulk of his estate to a spouse or lover."); Annot., 76 A.L.R.3d 743 
(1 977). 
I 00. Although most of the cases have involved property disputes between liv­
ing cohabitors who have separated, some cases have involved contractual or equi­
table claims by the survivor to a share of the other's estate upon the latter's 
death. Complaints founded upon breach of oral promises supported by social, 
domestic, nursing, and business services have been held to state a cause of action. 
See, e.g. , Poe v. Estate of Levy, 41 1 S.2d 253 (Fla. Ct. App. 1982) (reversing trial 
court's dismissal of count seeking enforcement of an express support contract 
and count seeking imposition of a constructive trust in certain property due to a 
confidential relationship between surviving cohabitor and decedent, but affirming 
trial court's dismissal of count seeking one-half ownership interest in decedent's 
property grounded on argument that their relationship had the same force and 
effect as a legal marriage); Donovan v. Scuderi, 443 A.2d 12 1  (Md. Ct. Spec. 
App. 1982) (plaintiff entitled to recover damages for breach of express oral prom­
ise to pay to plaintiff 1 ,000 shares of stock of the bank of which the decedent was 
chairman of the board, in return for which plaintiff made various expenditures 
and provided loans and services, including "catering services, personal shopping 
services (clothing, furniture and furnishings)"; decedent, a married man, and 
plaintiff, an unmarried woman, did not have a full-time cohabitation relationship, 
but frequently used an apartment plaintiff had obtained at decedent's request); 
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Plaintiffs seem to have no problem in stating a cause of action 
when they allege that they made afinancial contribution toward 
the purchase of specific property on the understanding that they 
would be the owner or part owner. The fact that the property 
was not titled in the plaintiff's name is not a defense. A cause of 
action for the imposition of a purchase-money resulting trust or a 
constructive trust on the specific property is well established. 1 0 1  
But what i f  the plaintiff's contribution came in the form of  do­
mestic services? The case that has received the most notoriety is 
Marvin v. Marvin. 102 The Marvin case was one of the first cases 
to confront the problem of remedy in a domestic-services case. 
Tyranski v. Piggins, 205 N.W.2d 595 (Mich. Ct. App. 1973) (surviving cohabitor 
entitled to specific performance of decedent's oral promise to convey house to 
her; plaintiff, a married woman who was separated from her husband, performed 
various domestic, social, and nursing services for decedent). 
Complaints have also been held to state a cause of action when they sought the 
imposition of a constructive trust on specific property based on a confidential 
relationship between the cohabitors. See, e.g. , Poe v. Estate of Levy, supra. 
Complaints seeking damages in the amount of the value of such services on the 
theory of quantum meruit (as much as the plaintiff deserved) have also been 
upheld. See, e.g. , Green v. Richmond, 337 N.E.2d 69 1 (Mass. 1975) (surviving 
cohabitor entitled to quantum meruit recovery of damages for value of social, 
domestic, and business services performed in reliance on decedent's oral promise 
to leave a will devising his entire estate to her); Humiston v. Bushnell, 394 A.2d 
844 (N.H. 1978) (lack of proof of alleged oral promise to devise a certain parcel 
of realty prevented surviving cohabitor from recovering damages for breach; sur­
viving cohabitor was entitled to recover in quantum meruit for value of "inti­
mate, confidential, and dedicated personal and business service" she performed 
for the decedent with the expectation of being ultimately compensated therefor); 
Estate of Steffes, 290 N. W.2d 697 (Wis. 1 980) (surviving cohabitor entitled to 
recover damages for value of housekeeping, farming, and nursing services ren­
dered at decedent's request and with the expectation of being compensated there­
for). 
Also, complaints seeking the imposition of an implied partnership with respect 
to a business arrangement have been upheld. See, e.g. , Estate of Thornton, 499 
P.2d 864 (Wash. 1 972) (surviving cohabitor entitled to recover on basis of an 
implied partnership in cattle-raising business). But the dismissal of a complaint 
seeking a half interest in the decedent's property based on the theory that the 
parties' relationship had the same force and effect as a legal marriage was af­
firmed. See, e.g. , Poe v. Estate of Levy, supra. 
10 1 .  See, e.g. , Estate of Eriksen, 337 N.W.2d 67 1 (Minn. 1 983) (surviving 
cohabitor entitled to constructive trust in her favor of a one-half interest in home 
purchased with joint funds but titled in decedent's name alone). 
102. 557 P.2d 1 06 (Cal. 1976) 
5 3  
These are the cases in which the domestic partnership follows the 
division-of-labor pattern of the traditional marriage. The plaintiff 
specializes in "household production," an asset perhaps worth 
something in the "remarriage market" after dissolution, but 
worth little in the labor market. The defendant specializes in ca­
reer advancement, a "divorce-proof " asset. 
These plaintiffs, consequently, are entering a much riskier ven­
ture than those entering a marriage with a similar division of la­
bor. Those entering a marriage with a similar division of labor at 
least have the divorce laws and the intestacy and elective-share or 
community-property laws as back-up protection. Those entering 
a nonmarital relationship have virtually no legal rights to fall 
back on. 
What can they do to protect themselves? One thing they can 
do is to insist on protection by contract, just as married persons 
use a premarital agreement. Academic lawyers tend to call this 
"private ordering." The reality is, however, that in many of the 
litigated cases, there is an enormous disparity of bargaining 
power. By being older and already wealthy, the defendant is 
often in a dominant position. For this reason, and because bar­
gaining is done in the shadow of one's legal rights and the unmar­
ried have virtually no back-up legal rights, the plaintiff is in a 
"subordinate" position. If there is to be a contract, a written con­
tract, the partner insisting on it is likely to be the dominant de­
fendant, not the subordinate plaintiff.103 The contract is more 
likely to take the form of what Bill Cantwell calls a "Non­
Marvenizing" agreement, under which the subordinate plaintiff in 
103. Premarital agreements are enforceable only if in writing. See Unif. Pre­
marital Agreement Act § 2 ( 1983) ("A premarital agreement must be in writing 
and signed by both parties. It is enforceable without consideration."). 
Legislation in Minnesota provides that an express written contract "between a 
man and a woman who are living together . . .  out of wedlock" is valid, even if 
"sexual relations between the parties are contemplated," but also provides that, 
in absence of an express written contract, any claim to another's earnings or 
property must be dismissed as contrary to public policy if it is "based on the fact 
that the individuals lived together in contemplation of sexual relations and out of 
wedlock within or without this state." Minn. Stat. §§ 5 1 3 .075, .076. 
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effect waives all rights. 104 The plaintiff is likely just as frightened 
to raise or press the subject of a contract as marriage. Plaintiffs 
who do press the issue, at least to some extent, are more likely to 
get vague oral statements than a written contract for their efforts. 
Consequently, the plaintiff in many of the litigated cases alleges 
an oral contract, which in the end may not be provable. The 
Marvin case fell into this category. The plaintiff, Michelle Triola, 
brought a breach of contract action against the defendant, Lee 
Marvin. Because the trial court granted judgment on the plead­
ings for the defendant, the question on appeal was whether the 
plaintiff's complaint stated a cause of action. The California 
Supreme Court held that it did, but on remand Michelle could 
not prove her allegation. 
The facts alleged in Michelle's complaint were that in October 
of 1964, she and Lee "entered into an oral agreement." As is 
typical of these complaints, Michelle not only listed the domestic 
services she agreed to perform but also the opportunities for em­
ployment or training she agreed to forego. The services she listed 
were "companion, homemaker, housekeeper and cook." 
Michelle's foregone opportunities were "her lucrative career as an 
entertainer [and] singer." Lee, in tum, she alleged, not only 
agreed "to share equally any and all property accumulated" dur­
ing the cohabitation105 but also "to provide for all of [her] finan­
cial support and needs for the rest of her life." 
104. As reported in J. Quinn, supra note 46, at 84, Bill Cantwell's "Non­
Marvenizing" Agreement, which would be suitable for parties of equal bargain­
ing power, states: 
We have decided to live together beginning on __ . We do not intend that 
any common law marriage should arise from this. We have not made any 
promises to each other about economic matters. We do not intend any eco­
nomic rights to arise from our relationship. If in the future we decide that 
any promises of an economic nature should exist between us, we will put 
them in writing, and only such written promises made by us in a written 
memorandum signed by us in the future shall have any force between us. 
Signed at __ on __ . 
105. Michelle's actual allegation was that the parties agreed that "they would 
combine their efforts and earnings and would share equally any and all property 
accumulated as a result of their efforts whether individual or combined." But, 
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Michelle and Lee lived together for about five and a half years 
(from October 1964 through May 1970). During this period, she 
alleged, the parties as a result of their efforts and earnings ac­
quired in Lee's name substantial real and personal property, in­
cluding motion picture rights worth over $1 million. In May 
1970, however, Lee (in the language of the complaint) "com­
pelled" her to leave his household. He continued to support her 
for another year and a half (until November 1971), but thereafter 
refused to provide further support. 
In a landmark decision, the California Supreme Court held 
that her complaint stated a cause of action. There are two aspects 
of the Marvin decision that I'd like to address. First is the ques­
tion of whether an express contract is enforceable, assuming that 
it can be proved if oral; second is whether the disappointed do­
mestic partner has any rights at all if no express contract can be 
proved. 
A. Enforceability of an Express Contract-the 
"Meretricious" Consideration Problem 
The principle obstacle to recovering for breach of an express 
oral contract, other than the difficulty of proving the contract, 
was what the courts call the "meretricious" nature of such a rela­
tionship - that the relationship involved sexual intimacy. Be­
cause prostitution is illegal, a contract for prostitution is 
unenforceable. A few post-Marvin decisions in other states have 
held that contracts between unmarried cohabitors are flat unen­
forceable for that reason alone, citing public policy grounds. 1 06 
Those decisions are still presumptively good law in those states. 
since the complaint alleged that Michelle promised to remove herself from the 
work force, it appears that it was Lee's earnings that were to be shared. 
106. See, e.g. , Rehak v. Mathis, 238 S.E.2d 8 1  (Ga. 1977) ("It is well settled 
that neither a court of law nor a court of equity will lend its aid to either party to 
a contract founded upon an illegal or immoral consideration. Code Ann. § 20-
50 1 .  . . .  The parties being unmarried and the appellant having admitted the fact 
of cohabitation in both verified pleadings, this would constitute immoral consid­
eration under Code Ann. § 20-501 . . . .  "); Hewitt v. Hewitt, 394 N.E.2d 1204 
(Ill. 1979) ("Illinois' public policy regarding agreements such as the one alleged 
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The Marvin court sought to remove this obstacle to enforce­
ment. The court held that the sexual component of the arrange­
ment could prevent enforcement only if the contract were 
"expressly and inseparably based upon an illicit consideration of 
sexual services." 107 This was not the case in Marvin, for Michelle 
did not allege that one of the services for which Lee agreed to pay 
was for her to be Lee's lover. 
The time has surely come to put the meretricious-consideration 
argument behind us. It is surely time to remove it as any poten­
tial obstacle at all to enforcement of these agreements, for there is 
no way these cases involve agreements for prostitution. Perhaps 
the Marvin court thought it had done that by making contracts 
enforceable unless the contract was "expressly and inseparably" 
based upon "sexual services." Nevertheless, in a subsequent Cali­
fornia case, Jones v. Daly, 108 the plaintiff made the mistake of 
alleging in his complaint that one of the services he agreed to 
perform, in addition to domestic services, was to be the defend­
ant's "lover." This proved to be fatal, for the court held that the 
complaint did not state a cause of action, citing the ground that 
the plaintiff's "allegations clearly show that plaintiff's rendition 
of sexual services to Daly was an inseparable part of the consider­
ation for the 'cohabitors agreement,' and indeed was the predomi­
nant consideration." "There is," the court said, "no severable 
portion of the 'cohabitors agreement' supported by independent 
consideration." 109 
The solution came in a still later case, Whorton v. Dil/ing­
ham. 1 10 The complaint in that case listed mutual sexual promises 
here was implemented long ago . . .  , where this court said: 'An agreement in 
consideration of future illicit cohabitation between the plaintiffs is void.' . . .  The 
issue, realistically, is whether it is appropriate for this court to grant a legal status 
to a private arrangement substituting for the institution of marriage sanctioned 
by the State. The question whether change is needed in the law . . .  [is best left to] 
the legislative branch . . .  "). 
107. Marvin, 5 57 P.2d at 1 14. 
108. 1 22 Cal. App. 3d 500, 1 76 Cal. Rptr. 1 30 ( 198 1 ). 
109. /d. at 509, 176 Cal. Rptr. at 1 34. 
1 1 0. 202 Cal. App. 3d 447, 248 Cal. Rptr. 405 ( 1988). 
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- that the plaintiff promised to be the defendant's "lover" and 
that the defendant promised to be the plaintiff's "lover." The 
court held the complaint stated a cause of action. In a key pas­
sage, the court stated that "by itemizing the mutual promises to 
engage in sexual activity, [the plaintiff] has not precluded the trier 
of fact from finding those promises are the consideration for each 
other and independent of the bargained for consideration for [the 
plaintiff's] employment." I I I  
It seems to me that the Whorton analysis suggests a responsible 
way around this problem. Even if sexual intimacy is listed in the 
complaint on only one side, surely the way to handle these cases 
is to presume that the sexual component of a cohabitation is al­
ways separable from the other parts of the contract, on the 
ground - to be blunt - that the consideration for sex is sex. 
B. Rights of Domestic Partners Who are Not Protected 
by a Provable Contract 
What if the plaintiff entered upon a cohabitation arrangement 
without contractual protection? In Marvin, Michelle did allege 
an oral contract, but she was unable to prove it. Should plaintiffs 
who never allege or cannot prove a contract ever receive relief? 
Or, should the law say that they knew what they were getting 
into, took the risk that it would not work out, and cannot now 
cry foul when they lost the gamble and the arrangement later fell 
apart? After all, they already got room and board, probably some 
gifts, and, in general, probably lived a higher life style than they 
could have afforded on their own. Is that not all they deserve? 
This is the most important question in this developing area. 
The courts in a few jurisdictions have closed the door to plaintiffs 
without an express contract1 1 2  and at least one legislature has 
I l l . /d. at 454, 248 Cal. Rptr. at 409- 10. 
1 1 2. See, e.g., Levar v. Elkins, 604 P.2d 602 (Alaska 1980); Estate of Alexan­
der, 445 So.2d 836 (Miss. 1984); Dominguez v. Cruz, 6 17  P.2d 1 322 (N.M. Ct. 
App. 1980); Marone v. Marone, 4 13  N.E.2d 1 1 54 (N.Y. 1980). The Alexander 
court held that if a remedy is to be given to a surviving cohabitant in the absence 
of an express contract, "the Legislature should provide the remedy." See also 
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closed the door to plaintiffs without an express written con­
tract.1 1 3  The advantage of such a bright-line test, especially the 
one that insists on an express written contract, is that it in­
troduces an element of efficiency into the law similar to the effi­
ciency accruing from grounding spousal rights on status. 1 14 The 
domestic partner with a contract can claim the contractual rights 
without having to prove anything about the underlying details or 
commitment of the relationship. Just as the marriage certificate 
qualifies the spouse for what the law allows, the written contract 
qualifies the domestic partner-plaintiff for what the contract 
allows. 
The disadvantage is that plaintiffs with just claims are shut out. 
This category includes plaintiffs who are in a "subordinate" posi­
tion to the defendant in terms of bargaining power, and hence are 
unable to obtain contractual protection. This category also in­
cludes plaintiffs who are unsophisticated in the ways of the law, 
the underclass, for want of a better term. 
To its credit, the court in the Marvin case thought that there 
would be cases that warranted relief even without a contract, and 
however you feel about the morality of these arrangements, there 
are cases in which the plaintiff's claim seems undeniably just. In 
seeking to find a way of analyzing this problem, the court in Mar­
vin used an interesting phrase. The court spoke, and spoke re­
peatedly, of enforcing the "reasonable expectations of the 
Carnes v. Sheldon, 3 1 1  N.W.2d 747 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981)  (although prior Mich­
igan cases have held that express contracts are enforceable to the extent they are 
based on independent consideration, and have enforced contracts implied in fact 
for wages or for the value of commercial services, the court in the instant case 
was "unwilling to extend equitable principles to the extent plaintiff would have 
us do, since recovery based on principles of contracts implied in law essentially 
would resurrect the old common-law marriage doctrine which was specifically 
abolished by the Legislature . . . .  [J]udicial restraint requires that the Legislature, 
rather than the judiciary, is the appropriate forum for addressing the question 
raised by plaintiff. We believe a contrary ruling would contravene the public pol­
icy of this state 'disfavoring the grant of mutually enforceable property rights to 
knowingly unmarried cohabitants.' "). 
1 1 3. See supra note 103. 
1 14. See text accompanying note 93, supra. 
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parties." "The courts may inquire into the conduct of the par­
ties 1 1 5  to determine whether that conduct demonstrates an im­
plied contract or implied agreement of partnership or joint 
venture, or some other tacit understanding between the parties," 
the court said. 
In speaking of the "reasonable expectations of the parties" -
plural - the court was probably knowingly engaging in a fiction. 
Few could doubt that the parties in the Marvin case did not enter 
or continue the arrangement with the same expectations. Some 
interesting empirical research has shown that different expecta­
tions are standard. The study found: 
In 39 percent of the cases for which we have couple data, one party 
believes they will marry and the other does not! This difference of 
perception is surely a factor in the higher instability of these unions. 
Another 1 1  percent agree that they will not get married, making 
just about half of all cohabiting couples where there is disagreement 
about marriage or no plans to marry. Twenty-nine percent agree 
that they have definite plans to marry, and in another 20 percent of 
the cases one partner has definite plans to marry, while the other 
thinks they will marry but does not have definite plans to do so. 1 16 
To be sure, this study reports on marriage expectations in shorter­
term cohabitations, and the Marvin court's emphasis was on a 
different type of expectation - the expectation that there will be 
"profit-sharing." To be sure, also, our emphasis is on the longer­
term, marriage-like cohabitations, those that are the exception 
overall but tend to accumulate in the population. In any event, 
Lee Marvin and Michelle Triola, it would probably be safe to 
speculate, did not share the same expectations, not even when 
1 1 5 .  According to Professor Glendon, the reference to an inquiry into the 
conduct of the parties raised "the prospect of litigation in which the private lives 
of the parties can be explored in detail [and] has led already to the settlement out 
of court of a number of suits by alleged same-sex lovers or clandestine playmates 
of well-known people." M. Glendon, supra note 39, at 279. 
1 1 6. Bumpass, Sweet & Cherlin, supra note 94, at 14. See also Rindfuss & 
VandenHeuvel, Cohabitation: Precursor to Marriage or an Alternative to Being 
Single, 16  Population & Dev. Rev. 703, 721 ( 1990) (empirical study finding that 
"cohabitors are substantially more similar [in their attitudes toward matters such 
as marriage and childbearing plans] to the singles than to the married."). 
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entering into or during the happy periods of their arrangement. 
Michelle probably hoped and maybe even expected that Lee 
would eventually marry her or, failing that, that he would "do 
right" by her financially. Whether Lee ever intended to do either 
is unclear. He certainly determined never to give her a dime 
shortly after they broke up. 
So, what do we make of the court's emphasis on "the reason­
able expectations of the parties"? The court could be saying one 
of two things. One is that there should be in inquiry into whether 
the defendant's behavior reasonably led the plaintiff to think that 
he had the same expectations she did, i. e. , whether the defendant 
led her on. The other, more significant possibility is that the 
court is saying that it will attribute or impute "reasonable" expec­
tations even when they are fictional regarding one of the parties. 
Although this latter idea came to nothing in the Marvin case 
itself, 1 1 7  some courts, in later cases, have begun to apply this idea. 
Case authority is beginning to appear in which marriage-like co­
habitation relationships are held to have the same force and effect 
as a legal marriage. 1 1 8 Many if not all of these cases involve rela­
tionships that would be common-law marriages 1 1 9 but for the ab-
1 17 .  On remand, Michelle failed to prove the existence of an express or im­
plied contract, but the trial court awarded her $104,000 for rehabilitation on the 
ground of an unspecified equitable theory. On appeal, the judgment granting this 
award was reversed for want of a "recognized underlying obligation in law or in 
equity." Marvin v. Marvin, 1 22 Cal. App. 3d 871 ,  176 Cal. Rptr. 555 ( 1 98 1). 
See also Taylor v. Polackwich, 145 Cal. App. 3d 1014, 194 Cal. Rptr. 8 ( 1983) 
("rehabilitative award" reversed on appeal). 
1 1 8. For examples of cases providing for equitable division of property ac­
quired while the couple cohabited before marrying or acquired while the couple 
cohabited after having divorced each other, see Eaton v. Johnson, 10 Fam. L. 
Rep. (BNA) 1094 (Kan. Ct. App. 1983); Pickens v. Pickens, 490 So.2d 872 
(Miss. 1986); Marriage of Lindsey, 678 P.2d 328 (Wash. 1 984). 
1 1 9. The requirements necessary to establish a common-law marriage vary 
somewhat from state to state, but have been summarized as follows: 
The jurisdictions which recognize common law marriages all require that 
the parties presently agree to enter into the relationship of husband and 
wife. Most jurisdictions also require cohabitation, or actually and openly 
living together as husband and wife. . . . Some jurisdictions further require 
that the parties hold themselves out to the world as husband and wife, and 
acquire a reputation as a married couple. However, other jurisdictions hold 
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olition of  that doctrine. 1 20 I'll give you two examples. 1 2 1  The 
first is Goode v. Goode, 122 a recent West Virginia case. Carl and 
Martha Goode separated after having lived together for 28 years. 
Although the couple had never formally married, they had con­
stantly held themselves out to the public as husband and wife. 
that cohabitation and reputation are not requirements of a valid common 
law marriage, but solely matters of evidence. 
Under all of these definitions, evidence that the parties have stated "We're 
not married, we're just living together" will destroy the claim of a common 
law marriage. 
Lovas, When Is a Family Not a Family? Inheritance and the Taxation of Inheri­
tance Within the Nontraditional Family, 24 Idaho L. Rev. 353, 361 ( 1987). 
120. Most states have abolished common-law marriage by statute. See, e.g. , 
Mich. Comp. Laws § 5 5 1 .2. As of 1987, only thirteen states (Alabama, Colorado, 
Georgia, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Montana, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode 
Island, South Carolina, and Texas) and the District of Columbia still recognized 
the concept. H. Clark, Law of Domestic Relations § 2.4 (2d ed. 1 987). 
Negative judicial and legislative reaction to the concept of common-law mar­
riage grew during the late nineteenth century. One criticism of the concept was 
that the informality of common-law marriages makes them highly vulnerable to 
fraud and peijury. More prominent was the argument that common-law mar­
riage undermined the sanctity of marriage. See, e.g. , Sorenson v. Sorenson, 100 
N.W. 930, 932 (Neb. 1 904). See generally M. Grossberg, Governing the Hearth: 
Law and the Family in Nineteenth-Century America ( 1985). 
In some states where common-law marriage has been abolished, courts have 
applied a de facto common-law marriage doctrine to couples who lived together 
in a common-law marriage state. In Kellard v. Kellard, 1 3  Fam. L. Rep. (BNA) 
1490 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1 987), a New York man and woman, unmarried but cohab­
iting with one another, took an automobile trip to Disney World in 1978. During 
the trip, they stayed overnight in a motel in South Carolina where they registered 
as husband and wife, and engaged in sexual intercourse. They also stayed for 
two nights in a motel in Georgia. Some years later, in defense to a divorce suit 
filed in New York by the woman, the man claimed that no divorce was necessary 
because he was not married to the plaintiff. A New York court rejected his de­
fense, holding that the couple's behavior enroute to Disney World satisfied the 
common-law marriage requirements of South Carolina and Georgia. This, along 
with the lengthy history of the couple's relationship, led the court to recognize 
them as married. See also Taylor, Increased Mobility Adds to Common Law 
Claims, Nat'! L.J., Aug. 1 4, 1989, at 24. 
1 2 1 .  Other post-Marvin cases have asserted claims based on nonfamily doc­
trines, such as express contract, contract implied in fact, contract implied in law, 
quantum meruit, and constructive trust. See, e.g. , Watts v. Watts, 405 N.W.2d 
303 (Wis. 1 987). Decisions in many of these cases are ambiguous as to whether 
the court based recovery on a contract implied in fact or on unjust enrichment 
grounds. 
122. 396 S.E.2d 430 (W. Va. 1990). 
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They had four children. Martha, age 47, filed a divorce action 
against Carl, age 6 1, seeking an equitable division of the property 
they had acquired during their 28-year period of cohabitation. 
Although West Virginia is not a common-law marriage state, the 
court held that Martha could recover, saying: 
[W]e hold that a court may order a division of property acquired 
by a man and woman who are unmarried cohabitants, but who have 
considered themselves and held themselves out to be husband and 
wife. Such order may be based upon principles of contract, either 
express or implied, or upon a constructive trust. Factors to be con­
sidered in ordering such a division of property may include: the 
purpose, duration, and stability of the relationship and the expecta­
tions of the parties. Provided, however, that if either the man or 
woman is validly married to another person during the period of 
cohabitation, the property rights of the spouse and support rights of 
the children of such man or woman shall not in any way be ad­
versely affected by such division of property. 123 The expectations 
of the parties under these circumstances would be equitable treat­
ment by the other party in exchange for engaging in such a cohab­
iting relationship. 
My second example is a case that goes even farther and allows 
an unmarried plaintiff to utilize the divorce laws directly. That 
case is a Washington case, Warden v. Warden. 1 24 Charles War­
den and Denise Boursier began living together in 1963, holding 
themselves out as husband and wife. They had two children. In 
1972, Charles moved to California and formally married another 
woman. After learning of this, Denise brought suit under the di­
vorce laws for child support and an equitable division of property, 
which the trial court awarded. Charles appealed that part of the 
123. Under the facts of this case, the parties Jived together for an extended 
period of time, considered themselves as husband and wife, and, in fact, pooled 
their resources to include taking property under three joint deeds. Therefore, in 
this case, the equities are more easily determined than in a relationship between 
two parties which was for a shorter duration, or where the parties did not con­
sider themselves to be husband and wife, or where the parties did not pool their 
resources. Cases in other jurisdictions have noted that "[e]ach case should be 
assessed on its own merits with consideration given to the purpose, duration and 
stability of the relationship and the expectations of the parties." Hay v. Hay, 1 00  
Nev. 196, 199, 678 P.2d 672, 674 ( 1 984). [Footnote b y  the court.] 
124. 676 P.2d 1037 (Wash. Ct. App. 1 984). 
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judgment decreeing a division of the property. Although Wash­
ington is not a common-law marriage state, the Washington 
Court of Appeals affirmed, saying: 
We believe the time has come for the provision of [the Washington 
statute providing for equitable division of property upon dissolution 
of a marriage] to govern the disposition of the property acquired by 
a man and a woman who have lived together and established a rela­
tionship which is tantamount to a marital family except for a legal 
marriage. 
The trial judge here properly treated Denise and Charles as a 
marital family and correctly considered the length and purpose of 
their relationship, the two children, the contributions of the parties, 
and the future prospects of each. He correctly assumed that both 
Denise and Charles contributed to the acquisition of the property 
and divided it in a manner which was "just and equitable after con­
sidering all relevant factors." l 25 
If the plaintiff in this case could utilize the divorce laws to gain a 
share of the "marital" property, surely a similarly situated plain­
tiff could gain an intestate share of the defendant's estate and, 
since Washington is a community-property states, claim her half 
of the "community property." 
If the law begins to grant extra-contractual rights to disap­
pointed domestic partners, does this mean that the law is edging 
toward granting rights based on "status"? The answer appears to 
be both Yes and No. To the extent that rights are granted with­
out having been explicitly bargained for, yes it seems that rights 
are being granted on the basis of status. Unlike marital status or 
contractual status, however, each litigated cohabitation must be 
probed in order to classify it as marriage-like or non-marriage­
like to determine whether relief is warranted. Each plaintiff must 
prove that the underlying nature of his or her relationship with 
the defendant warrants recovery, that the relationship fits within 
the criteria of a marriage-like cohabitation. The extract quoted 
from the Warden opinion gives some idea of what must be 
proved. Another definition comes from the recent New York 
1 25. Jd. at 1039- 40. 
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case of Brase hi v. Stahl Associates Co. ,  126 a case that involved an 
analogous question under the New York rent control laws: There 
must be, the court said: 
an objective examination of the relationship of the parties[, includ­
ing] the exclusivity and longevity of the relationship, the level of 
emotional and financial commitment, the manner in which the par­
ties have conducted their everyday lives and held themselves out to 
society, and the reliance placed upon one another for daily family 
services. . . . These factors are most helpful, although it should be 
emphasized that the presence or absence of one or more of them is 
not dispositive since it is the totality of the relationship as evidenced 
by the dedication, caring and self-sacrifice of the parties which 
should, in the final analysis, controi. 1 27 
The question these cases leave us with is: Are we obliged to 
continue resolving these issues inefficiently, on a case-by-case ba­
sis? We may be for a time, perhaps quite a long time, but eventu­
ally there will be pressure to minimize case-by-case adjudication 
by opening up more efficient, bright-line tests into which most 
plaintiffs with just claims could fit automatically. I would like to 
offer a couple of tentative ideas. 
One possibility is to consider enacting legislation along the 
lines of a New Hampshire statute. In codifying a statutory ver­
sion of common-law marriage, New Hampshire introduced a 
three-year bright-line rule. That legislation provides: 
Cohabitation, etc. Persons cohabiting and acknowledging each 
other as husband and wife, and generally reputed to be such, for the 
period of 3 years, and until the decease of one of them, shall there­
after be deemed to have been legally married. 128 
There is no magic in three years, of course, though that seems a 
decent compromise. ' 29 
126. 543 N.E.2d 49 (N.Y. 1989). 
127. /d. at 55. See also Truethart, Adopting a More Realistic Definition of 
"Family, " 26 Gonzaga L. Rev. 9 1  ( 1 990/9 1). 
128. N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 457:39. 
129. Remember, though, that only about 10% of cohabiting couples remain 
together beyond five years, and so a five-year requirement might be given 
consideration. 
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Another opportunity, not mutually exclusive with a fixed-time 
rule, would arise if domestic-partnership registration legislation 
should become state law. Ordinances in a number of municipali­
ties have set up domestic partnership registries. In some munici­
palities, registration has no legal effect whatever, whereas in 
others it has the effect of extending the same employee benefits, 
such as health insurance, to the domestic partners of registering 
city employees that are extended to spouses of city employees. 130 
Extending this type of legislation to the state level is likely to be 
very controversial. 131  Should it come about, however, the legisla­
tion need not and hopefully will not attribute martial status to 
those who register, although that would be a possibility. Another 
approach would be to provide registrants with an optional check­
off system that would serve as a written contract. The registering 
partners could be given the opportunity to check off whether or 
not they want to be treated as if they were married for purposes 
of divorce, intestacy, and elective-share or community law, or to 
opt for some other system for regulating their financial affairs. 
The more the law can do to encourage and facilitate written con­
tracts, the more efficient the system will become. 
Other creative measures may also come to light to handle this 
thorny question in the near term and beyond. The area certainly 
cries out for more efficient solutions than we now have. 
1 30. See Truethart, supra note 127, at 101-05. 
13 I .  See, e.g., Unmarried-Partners'  Rights Test Those of Washington, N.Y. 
Times, March 10, 1992, at A 1 3, describing a brewing controversy about a domes­
tic-partnership ordinance recently passed by the City Council of the District of 
Columbia. The ordinance, called the Health Care Benefits Expansion Act, enti­
tles registering District employees to add their domestic partners to their health 
insurance coverage and provides a tax benefit to private companies that expand 
health benefits to domestic partners of registering employees. 
Congress reviews and can repeal District of Columbia ordinances. Some mem­
bers of the House District of Columbia Committee have expressed opposition to 
the ordinance on the ground that it undermines the traditional family. 
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CONCLUSION 
Spousal rights are in a state of transition, but the directional 
trends seem clear and you, as ACTEC members, can help speed 
the process along by working in your state for legislative reform. 
I would urge you to take a close look at the spouse's intestate 
share and, in title-based states, the spouse's elective share. 
In intestacy, the lump-sum-plus-a-fraction rather than the 
straight fractional-share approach for marriages in which there 
are step children is the only way of granting economic security to 
a surviving spouse who is beyond working years, as most are, 
before the estate gets divided between the spouse and children. 
In the title-based states, adoption of the community-property 
system would be ideal. In the meantime, attention should be 
given to the elective share, for the partnership approach is an idea 
whose time has surely come. It needs to be implemented and 
joined with a minimum support element. It also needs to be 
backed up with an augmented-estate concept, so that evasion by 
will substitute is curtailed. 
Both these intestacy and elective-share features have already 
been worked out in fine detail and converted to statutory lan­
guage in the 1990 revisions of the Uniform Probate Code. If 
study of those revisions is not yet underway in your state, I urge 
you to take steps to get that study process going. Finally, as that 
process does get underway, I recognize that it is inevitable that 
questions will arise. When and if they do, please contact me or a 
member of the Joint Editorial Board for assistance. We are 
happy to help in any way we can, in explaining the theory of any 
provision, what it means, or how it fits together with other provi­
sions to form a coherent whole. Opening up lines of communica­
tion between us and your state study committee can only be 
beneficial to the ultimate improvement of the law. 
